New Congressional Report on Homegrown Terrorism: Late and Off-target

Earlier last week the US House of Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security issued a report on the subject, “Al-Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland.”  Four years ago the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) brought this to the attention of their senior leadership and Congress.  Unfortunately, one excuse after another was raised as obstacles to the two primary weapons against terrorism; information sharing and public awareness.  Congress is just now getting around to issuing a report about this threat that has been on counterterrorists’ radar since 2007; however, while the report is relatively accurate, it is mistaken on quite a few points and fails to put the actual threat in context for use by local and state law enforcement.

According to the report, the US counterterrorism community “underestimated the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda in Yemen’s capability of launching attacks” in the Homeland and that “we cannot afford to make the same mistake with Shabaab.”  First, our Intelligence Community has always placed a higher priority on terrorists from the Arabian Peninsula, which includes Yemen, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.  For example, the then-Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Michael Leiter, testified before the Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) in September 2009 that “al-Qa`ida and its affiliates and allies remain resilient and adaptive enemies intent on attacking US and Western interests,” with specific mention that “al-Qa`ida’s core in Pakistan represent[s] the most dangerous component of the larger al-Qa`ida network.”  And while there has always been the possibility of a threat from Somalia, it has only been in the last 18-months that a real threat has been considered more likely.  This is due to the fact that previously DHS and the FBI considered al-Shabaab too preoccupied with consolidating their control over Somalia and removing foreign troops from their homeland and less concerned with allowing al-Qa`ida East Africa (AQEA) to hijack their training facilities, cadres, and recruits to carry out attacks against the US.       

The Somali Diaspora in America

With this recent report the committee lays bare some of the challenges we face when dealing with Muslim communities in the Homeland.  However, the report does not explain the extenuating factors behind those challenges, specifically with regard to the Somali-American communities here in the US.  For example, unlike other Muslim communities in the US, those from Somalia are recent arrivals.  The great majority of Somali-Americans did not come to the US until the mid- to late-1990s; and then they came en masse.  This presented numerous challenges to both the incoming Somalis and the communities to which they were destined.  Unlike previous migrations of immigrants, there were no large, established Somali communities in the US to welcome the new arrivals.  Therefore, there were no established communities into which they could settle and which could aid them in communicating with the English-speaking welfare workers, school districts, hospitals, or law enforcement.  The Somalis were essentially on a deserted island in the middle of the most developed country in the world.  This obviously led to numerous issues, both within the Somali community and around it.  Within the community, without being able to speak the language, many, if not most, were unable to do the basic things in life such as get good paying jobs, apply for certain immigrant benefits, and go to college.  Other black communities harassed the Somalis for not being American or being able to speak English.  This led to insularity within the Somali community.  Young Somali boys and men banded together to defend themselves and their communities, leading to the creation of Somali-only gangs.  Additionally, Somalis, like many immigrants from underdeveloped, corrupt countries, intensely distrust law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which in their home countries are usually one and the same.  These agencies routinely grab innocent people off the streets or out of their homes either because they slighted the ruling regime in some way or simply to elicit ransom money from the person’s family.  These detentions are almost always accompanied by torture, forcing the detainee to confess, whether they are guilty or not.  Even fleeing their country to neighboring countries with other refugees, they are at the mercy of foreign government officials who detain and torture them to ensure they are not criminals or terrorists or to obtain some sort of outrageous payment to enter the country or refugee camp.  This distrust of foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies did not change when they arrived in the US, thus creating the illusion that Somali communities are not very cooperative with law enforcement. 

This insulation also led to an identity crisis in the Somali communities.  The older Somalis, the ones who made the decision to immigrate to the US, remembered what it was like in war-torn Somalia.  They understood that as bad as it might be in America, at least they did not have to worry about armed militias attacking their villages or kidnapping their children for use in their armies.  However, the younger Somalis, those who were mere babies when they came to America or who were born here shortly after arriving, knew nothing of the hardships their parents faced in their old country.  All they knew was that they were not only not accepted as American, they were not even accepted as African-American by other black communities.  The only thing to which they could cling, and to which they could identify with other communities, was their Islamic religion.

Al-Shabaab and Radicalization of Somalis in America

Then came 9/11.  Now, not only were they disparaged for being recently-arrived African immigrants, but they were hassled and despised for being Muslim.  The younger Somalis, growing up with this harassment and hatred, felt nothing could be as bad as their current situation.  If this is what Western democracies were like, then there was no reason they should not be able to go home, back to Somalia, where they would fit in with other Somalis and other Muslims.  At least this was their initial thinking.  They wanted to make something of themselves and it was promised to them by others in their communities.  Unfortunately, these “others” were the same people the parents of these young people had wanted to leave behind.  Instead, many followed them to America.  These people were former members of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), comprised of multiple radical Muslim groups that consolidated control over most of central and southern Somalia in late 2006.  The ICU was able to do what no other Somali group had done since the civil war began in 1991; they brought peace to the parts of Somalia they controlled.  However, the group had two key elements going against it, first, Christian-led Ethiopia was not about to let a Muslim-led government take control in Somalia, and two, the ICU helped hide two key al-Qa`ida members involved in the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa in 1998 and the US wanted them.

As a result, the rule of al-Shabaab lasted only a few weeks when Ethiopia invaded and occupied Somalia, primarily the capitol Mogadishu.  The ICU scattered into the hinterlands of Somalia, where the Ethiopians would not dare follow.  As a result, the ICU, already a fragile alliance of multiple Islamist groups, each with their own leadership, objectives, and end-states, splintered.  Some of the more moderate members wanted to work towards a peaceful assumption of government, compromising with Ethiopia and the US while balancing the wants and needs of the Somali people with respect to their Islamic roots.  Other, more radical elements of the former ICU, particularly those affiliated with the armed wing of the group, Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, or Mujahidin Youth Movement, joining forces again with other like-minded radical Islamist groups, sought to continue the armed struggle to take over the government and implement strict Islamic law, Shari`a, and oppose any outside interference by Ethiopia or the US.

However, as previously mentioned, al-Shabaab is comprised of at least four major radical Islamist groups who work together when needed, such as fighting against Ethiopian occupation, but, as was seen when Ethiopia withdrew its forces, were equally satisfied with fighting each other for control of lucrative areas in southern Somalia, such as the port of Kismaayao.  It was these reasons, their fight against Ethiopia and their own internal conflicts, that have led most counterterrorism analysts to determine that while al-Shabaab leadership may have the intent to attack the US and its interests, it did not have the capability as their arsenals were already prioritized.

As for American citizens in its ranks, the most serious threat to the Homeland, the report claims, “No Al Qaeda group…has attracted anywhere near as many American and Western recruits as Shabaab has over the past three years.”  This statement, like a good portion of the report, is misleading.  What it fails to mention is that a number of the American-born Muslim converts either wanted to go to places such as Pakistan or Yemen, but were discouraged or, after seeing the abundant media reports about the ease with which Somali-Americans were able to go and join al-Shabaab, opted to go there instead.  There is no mysterious al-Shabaab recruiting network secretly recruiting American-born Muslim converts to join al-Shabaab; it is simply that there is no cohesive government in Somalia, thereby leaving the borders porous, and al-Shabaab leadership has openly allied itself with al-Qa`ida, thus attracting the most radical, and potentially most violent type of recruit, the American-born Muslim convert. 

Al-Shabaab is comprised of two elements, which the House of Representatives’ report erroneously combines under a single terrorist umbrella; Somali-Americans, the great majority of whom were convinced to return to Somalia either for nationalist reasons or who were tricked into returning for other reasons and then convinced or coerced to stay and fight, and American-born, Muslim converts who went to Somalia specifically in an effort to join the global jihadi insurgency inspired by the al-Qa`ida movement.  In the world of counterterrorism, a person’s intent is just as critical as their capability to carry out a terrorist attack.  While the majority of Somalis, both in the US and in Somalia, sympathize with al-Shabaab’s efforts to rid their homeland of interlopers, they do not agree with al-Qa`ida’s wider, global goals of jihad against the West.  The majority of the rank-and-file al-Shabaab fighters are concerned with securing Somalia and ridding it of foreign influences.  The same cannot be said for American-born, Muslim converts who went to Somalia in an effort to join al-Qa`ida or an al-Qa`ida affiliate.

These two groups of US citizens, Somali-Americans and US-born Muslim converts, cannot easily be lumped into the same category as al-Qa`ida-inspired terrorists.  The House report would have everyone believe all Somali-Americans are being secretly radicalized in their local mosques and are fully aware that they are traveling to Somalia to train in terrorist operations, particularly suicide bombing, and will then be sent back to the US to carry out suicide attacks.  The report states that the first-ever suicide attack carried out by an American, Shirwa Ahmed, an American-Somali, in Somalia in 2008, “immediately raised serious fears among homeland security-focused officials that if an American Muslim could be radicalized to be a suicide bomber overseas, he could be convinced to do it back home.”  While theoretically true, any person, with the proper indoctrination, can be radicalized to carry out suicide attacks, the intent must come from the person themselves.  There must be a reason for this person to want to carry out a suicide attack.  An individual like Shirwa Ahmed, who probably firmly believed in his mind he was giving his life for the greater good of his country, will more than likely not seek to undertake a suicide mission for any other reason.  If that were the case, if al-Qa`ida, using al-Shabaab as a proxy training and operational cell, wanted to use Somali-Americans to carry out attacks against and within the US, why would they take the chance on having them travel overseas, where the risks of being picked up on the Intelligence Community’s radar are much greater, just to receive training that can be just as easily conducted here in the US without raising as much suspicion?  Since 9/11 al-Qa`ida and al-Qa`ida-inspired operatives have continually sought ways to enter the US without arousing suspicion; why not leave their potential operatives where they are in the US and risk sending just the master bombmaker or trainer here?

Similarly, the report claims “Shabaab recruiters have used mosques as cover and as safe places…to recruit and raise money to support Shabaab.”  What the report fails to highlight is that for every one person they attempt to be truthful with, there are dozens more who are told that they are raising money and other types of donations to support the widows and orphans back in Somalia, when in reality it is all going to support al-Shabaab.

The Solution

So how do we address the problem?  First and foremost the US government must employ a holistic approach to the problem.  Why are these young men willing to return to Somalia?  We should address those problems, both internally with local support groups, and internationally, by supporting a government in Somalia that the people, not Ethiopia, will accept.  Additionally, if Somalia is such as haven for terrorist threats to the US, why does President Obama not go there and give a speech like he did in Cairo?  The only messages the al-Shabaab fighters get are those from their radical leadership and the attacks the US has carried out in the country; reassure the common al-Shabaab soldier he is not the target and that we only want peace for Somalia.

What about those Somali-Americans already there fighting with al-Shabaab?  One possible solution is to use the carrot-stick approach.  The majority of Somali-Americans who went to Somalia and joined al-Shabaab did so out of nationalistic fervor, at a time when Ethiopian troops, Somalia’s main antagonist in the region, were deployed in Somalia to ensure a radical Islamist government could not come to power.  The only difference between these individuals and those of Jewish extraction who go to Israel to join its military to fight Palestinians is that the US happens to support Israel and there is no US politician willing to stand against Israel; whereas, in the case of Somalia, the US backs Christian-dominated Ethiopia and therefore considers any Somali who fights against the foreign incursion into their country by Ethiopia a personal affront to America and its ally in the region.  As a result, any Somali-American who returns to Somalia to fight foreign troops is automatically considered a terrorist and is hesitant to return to the US where they will most likely face criminal or terrorist charges.  Instead of lumping all Somali-Americans who fight with al-Shabaab as terrorists, each one should be determined on a case-by-case basis.  They should be given an ultimatum; return to the US and renounce violence and work within the confines of the international legal community to help bring peace to their homeland or lose their American citizenship and remain in Somalia, possibly being labeled as a terrorist and suffer the consequences of that label.  This can also be applied to those here in the US intent on supporting al-Shabaab; either they cease and desist or face the possibility of losing their resident status and being returned to Somalia to the current government.

Obviously there will be those who refuse to return or stop their support, especially the American Muslim-converts, such as Omar Hammami and others of his ilk, who went to Somalia specifically to get closer to al-Qa`ida.  There is no excuse for these individuals and as a result they should be hunted as al-Qa`ida operatives by the US military and Intelligence Community.  These individuals are the real threat to the Homeland, something not made very clear in the House’s latest report.

Conclusion

Radicalization is at the heart of terrorism, whether it is al-Qa`ida’s brand of global jihadist terrorism, Christian-identity terror, black separatist terror, or right-wing Neo-Nazi or KKK terror.  Everyone has a breaking point and any person, under the right circumstances and conditions, with the appropriate level of hatred and radical beliefs, can be swayed to commit acts of terrorism or support terrorist groups.  To accuse anyone who has received any level of military training, whether it was provided by a group such as al-Shabaab or from the US military, of being a potential terrorist is simply asinine and idiotic.  We must identify the intent behind the individuals as well as the groups with which they associate in order to better identify the threats of homegrown terrorists.  This can only be done at the grass-roots level; local and state law enforcement and the communities in which these individuals live and associate.  For the FBI and DHS to try and gauge the level of radicalization at their level is like trying to ascertain the license plate of a car on a road from an airplane 30,000-ft in the air.

Congress needs to investigate and issue a report on the intelligence gaps and failure to share information between the federal and state / local level.  A key example is the case of Omar Hammami.  Initially, in 2007, the FBI’s reasoning for keeping this intelligence under wraps, to include keeping some of the more critical information from state and local law enforcement, was to allow the bad guys to continue to operate normally and lead law enforcement to others in their group; it made sense, from a law enforcement and counterterrorism perspective.  However, DHS soon found out how limited the FBI’s information sharing was with state and local law enforcement, with the release of a propaganda video in March 2009 starring Omar Hammami, aka Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, a US-born Muslim convert, not even of Somali descent.  At the time, though DHS knew he was an American, we only knew him by his nom de guerre.  Once some simple research and comparisons were done, DHS published an Unclassified // For Official Use Only (U//FOUO) document for dissemination to state and local law enforcement agencies, especially those in Alabama since that is where we found, on the Internet, information about Hammami and the Muslim Student Association at the University of South Alabama.  When law enforcement agencies from Alabama thanked DHS for the information and queried the FBI on why it did not come from them, especially when it was discovered the FBI knew his true identity since at least 2007, it was then that we found out the extent, or the lack thereof, of the FBI’s information sharing with state and local counterparts.

The state and local law enforcement officials working at the ground-level, in and with the Somali communities, will be among the first to sense a change of attitude or notice missing individuals; therefore, unless potential threats are shared in a timely and forthcoming manner our counterterrorism community as a whole will always play the reactive vice proactive role and Congress will continue to hold hearings and investigations into threats that are years old.

Anwar al-Aulaqi: To kill or not to kill...

I am beginning to wonder how many people really and truly understand the difference between war / combat and criminal justice. As a counterterrorism professional with 15-years of experience in the field and degrees in criminal justice and international relations, both with focuses on terrorism, it is easy for me to differentiate between the two. However, and quite unfortunately, it seems like many others, especially those with no experience in the field, either find it difficult to separate the two or refuse to draw the line between them.

Regardless of what it is called, the United States is at war with al-Qa`ida, its allies, affiliates, and ideology. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others of their ilk are enemy combatants. If encountered outside of the United States, especially if encountered in a special interest country (i.e. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, etc), also known as the battlefield, they are prime candidates to be justifiably and legally killed in action. This also applies to U.S. citizens like Adam Gadahn, Omar Hammami, and Anwar al-Aulaqi.

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and Department of Defense (DOD) saw the utility early on of arming drones and using them to attack terrorists who would disappear into hiding if we had to rely on getting special forces to their location to take them down. Nothing against our special operators, but there is absolutely no way logistically we could keep them on stand-by 24/7 and within a few minutes flight from every possible location where we might encounter terrorists. While we unfortunately have not been able to eliminate the top-tier targets like bin Laden and Zawahiri, this program has been used very successfully to eliminate numerous mid-level al-Qa`ida operatives, the “worker bees’ if you will, which in turn has kept the group off balance and unable to successfully coordinate another 9/11-style attack. This cannot be denied.

Earlier this year the Obama administration added Anwar al-Aulaqi's name to a special list of individuals that can be eliminated by CIA drone if encountered, according to media sources. Aulaqi, a dual Yemeni-U.S. citizen, was born in New Mexico. He was not a concern to the IC or law enforcement until the 9/11 Commission began its investigation. The Commission found that while Aulaqi was the imam, spiritual leader, at a mosque in San Diego he befriended two of the 9/11 hijackers. He then moved to the Washington, DC area and took a position as the imam at a northern Virginia mosque where he again found himself in contact with at least one of the hijackers. Though he was questioned about his ties to the hijackers, it was determined he had no foreknowledge of the attacks. He then left for Yemen and has since assumed a role as an al-Qa`ida propagandist.

Until November 2009 Aulaqi was really only known in the jihadist and counterterror arenas. His name was mentioned in terrorism cases such as the Ft. Dix Five as being inspirational to at least two of the plotters. He gained notoriety in November with the shooting at Ft. Hood, TX by Hasan Nidal who it was revealed had been in contact with Aulaqi, even as far back as 2001 when Nidal attended the same northern Virginia mosque as some of the 9/11 hijackers and where Aulaqi served as imam. Aulaqi even posted approval of the shootings. Then in December Umar Abdulmutallab, the inept underwear bomber, was been linked to Aulaqi. And most recently Faizal Shahzad, the alleged Times Square bomber, has been linked to Aulaqi. How many more chances should Aulaqi be given to radicalize some young Muslim and either inspire or actually direct him, or her, to execute an attack on U.S. soil? When do we draw the line? He obviously is not going to turn himself in. He was in Yemeni custody once before and immediately went underground as soon as he was released.

In a recent New York Times article by Scott Shane, Vicki Divoll, a former CIA lawyer and now a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, claimed she is concerned for Aulaqi’s rights. She stated that while “Congress has protected Awlaki’s cellphone calls,” referring to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that requires special warrants to monitor electronic transmissions involving U.S. citizens, “it has not provided any protections for his life.” She goes on to argue that judicial process should be required if the individual in question is a U.S. citizen and not on “a traditional battlefield.” Glenn Greenwald, in his recent article in Salon, makes the same argument, claiming “Barack Obama claims the right to assassinate Americans far from any battlefield and with no due process of any kind.”

It is understandable how Mr. Greenwald can err on the side of the law, but Ms. Divoll, as a former CIA employee, should be the first to understand this is not a traditional war and that al-Qa`ida determines the battlefield by their presence and that drone strikes are not assassinations, but are military tools used in combat to kill the enemy before they can kill us; some battlefields require a law enforcement approach, such as here in the U.S., while others require a military approach.

If this were WWII and an American were fighting on the side of the Axis and was killed, would we be having the same argument? No. People back then understood, if one takes up arms against one's country, especially in support of that country's enemy and outside the legal jurisdiction of that country, they can be killed. Obviously the rules of war apply. If the individual in question surrenders they would be treated accordingly.

Anwar al-Aulaqi is an Internet jihadist radicalizer, recruiter, and propagandist and stays well abreast of current events. He knows he has made the "drone list." If he chooses to continue his activities, well aware he can be targeted at-will by the CIA or the military, then he must assume the risk that comes with that choice. He knows where the local authorities are located; he can easily turn himself in.

This latest controversy is but one example of the mixed message the Obama administration is sending to the American people. While I did not agree with the term, at least with Bush’s “War on Terror” everyone knew, unequivocally, if you had ties to terrorists you were a legitimate target and could expect to be killed, unless you were lucky enough to get arrested or turn yourself in. However, even then you would be labeled an “enemy combatant” and would soon find yourself at Guantanamo Bay (Gitmo) being interrogated with no clue as to when you would be released. Obama’s promises to close Gitmo and to try certain terrorists in U.S. criminal court have blurred the line between combat operations and law enforcement, thus creating confusion about how terrorists are to be treated and who should be hunting them. Let’s face it, these people are terrorists, not bank robbers, they are enemy combatants and should be hunted on the battlefield by our Soldiers and Marines, not by the FBI, and they should not be afforded any rights except the right to live if they surrender. Enemy combatants overseas in previous wars were not Mirandized or afforded trials in U.S. courts. They were either killed or, if they surrendered, found themselves interrogated and held for the duration of the conflict.

We cannot wait for the next attempted bombing, where we may not be as lucky as we have been for the last few, nor can we simply rely on the counterterrorism forces in countries with unstable governments and internal conflicts. Counterterrorism is a matter of self-defense and cannot entail waiting for a bomb to go off so we can ensure due process is served.

Times Square: Latest Attempt by Homegrown Terrorists

The attempted car bombing of New York City's Times Square is yet the latest example of the increased threat by homegrown terrorists in this country and the lack of a comprehensive, effective strategy to combat homegrown terrorists by the Obama administration.

The administration's current strategy, allowing the terrorists to demonstrate their ineptitude and stupidity by setting off their explosives so the rest of the world, especially those near the devices, can see just how incompetent these terrorists really are, seems to be working quite well for Obama's counter-terror departments and agencies. So far none have actually succeeded in blowing anyone or anything up. However, I do not know how long that strategy will continue to work before the terrorists actually catch on and begin to take this more seriously.

It seems Obama's message of "hope" during his campaign was a foreshadowing of how he would conduct counter-terror operations; he would close his eyes really hard and "hope" the bad guys don't kill anyone. Way to go. The new strategy will be regular public service announcements asking everyone in America to "clap their hands and don't let Tink, er, the bad guys' bombs explode!" That should probably do it.

The rise of Islamic terrorism in the United States: Extremism and Radicalization on the Home Front

For the uninitiated, the terms extremism and radicalization are simply words associated with terrorists abroad; they have nothing to do with American citizens or immigrants living in the United States because we do not have a problem here at home. That appears to be the stance the Obama administration took early last year when President Obama entered the White House. While President Bush left office with a clear understanding of the threat posed by extremism and radicalization, President Obama entered office focused almost exclusively on healthcare. Now, as clearly evident by attacks and arrests over the past 12-months, there is no denying the fact the United States has a problem with extremism and radicalization in America and it appears it will only get worse in the foreseeable future.

President Bush’s counterterrorism strategies left little doubt as to who the enemy was and what was needed to defeat them. Some may say his counterterror policies, like his political leanings, were too right-wing. If that was the case under Bush, then under Obama the new policies are too left-wing. Regardless of the reasons the United States entered Afghanistan or Iraq, the fact is we are fighting a two-front war in Muslim countries. This alone is a key recruitment pitch for al-Qa`ida and its affiliates.

Let’s face it, regardless of what it is called, Global War on Terror, GWOT, War on Terrorism, War on al-Qa`ida, Manmade disasters, etc…we are at war. I understand President Obama has a lot on his plate, but unfortunately, he put most of it there, all the while knowing it would just be a matter of time before al-Qa`ida attempted another spectacular attack on the Homeland. While we face a severe recession, it makes sense to place the economy at the top of the president’s priorities, alongside terrorism; however, Obama’s fight for healthcare should never have eclipsed our fight with al-Qa`ida. One need only look at the lead news stories since last January and you will see healthcare, along with blaming Bush for everything, has been this administration’s top priority ever since taking office.

A handful of dedicated counterterrorism analysts have been focused on the problem of extremism and radicalization since 2007. Even though prior to 2008 extremism and radicalization was viewed almost exclusively as a European problem, these analysts understood it was only a matter of time before we began to see similar problems here. Unfortunately, as the Obama administration came to power, the extremism and radicalization mission was relegated to the back burner. This was done for two reasons, one, there had been no evidence to that point of an extremism and radicalization problem in the United States, and two, and most importantly, it was ignored because of the political sensitivities surrounding the issue.

Trying to reenergize the extremism and radicalization mission is now an issue which is taking on increased urgency for the Obama administration, as it tries to reverse its effects on the U.S. counterterrorism community in the face of patent evidence of a growing extremism and radicalization problem in the Homeland. For years, the commonly held view has been that the U.S. did not have a serious radicalization issue at home, in contrast to what was occurring on the ground in Europe, because we did not have the same problem assimilating our Muslim population. The slew of cases over the past year of U.S. citizens who were radicalized and apparently eager to take action, against targets here and abroad, has raised new concerns about the threat of homegrown terrorism. Senior Obama administration officials have candidly acknowledged that the view of the situation has changed. As U.S. attorney general Eric Holder observed in a July 2009 speech after a spate of arrests in the U.S., the "whole notion of radicalization is something that did not loom as large a few months ago...as it does now." And in December, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano noted that “[h]ome-based terrorism is here. And like violent extremism abroad, it will be part of the threat picture we must now confront.” Both were wrong, this phenomenon has been here, we have been facing it for some time now, but Team Obama is only now prepared to recognize it as a problem.

I contend that our problem of homegrown violent Islamist extremists is worse than that faced by our European allies. The UK, Germany, Spain, and the Low Countries (Holland, Belgium, etc) have faced the radicalization of their first- and second-generation Muslim populations. The reasons for this are many, but in almost all cases we can at least understand why it occurs, even if we do not agree on the exact cause; we have a couple of issues to which we can at least point and we have a population that can be addressed. The United States, on the other hand, cannot point to even one reason for our homegrown violent Islamist extremists. I am not talking about our issue with radicalized first- and second-generation Muslims. Like our European cousins, the reasons for their radicalization are many and in almost all cases we can at least understand why it occurs, even if we do not agree on the exact cause. Likewise, we can address a specific segment of the population with outreach and engagement efforts. However, we have a much bigger threat; homegrown violent Islamist extremists. These are the American-born, or American-raised, non-Muslims, who later convert and decide, for whatever reason, they need to align themselves with al-Qa`ida and carry out a terrorist attack in their homeland. Their backgrounds, ethnicities, and reasons are as diverse as our population. How do we reach out to them when there is no, single at-risk population? How do we gauge which group of people are the most likely to convert and attack us from within?

No one has the answers. And President Obama’s counterterror team will not find the answers by sticking their head in the sand and pretending the problem does not exist.

(Be sure to keep an eye out for my upcoming book, The rise of Islamic terrorism in the United States: Extremism and Radicalization on the Home Front, that will address this specific problem set.)