*This is an update to my recent post on the firing by President Obama of U.S. General Stanley McChrystal.
Terrorists are now using Obama’s actions this week as propaganda. Obama relieved General Stanley McChrystal who had been recalled to Washington this week for allegedly criticizing colleagues and administration officials in comments he made to Michael Hastings, the author of a recently published Rolling Stone article.
Now, websites of radical Islamist groups, such as the Taliban, are promoting the firing as evidence the United States has lost the war in Afghanistan and Gen. McChrystal is being used as a scapegoat by the Obama administration. Another website, owned by a group calling itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, claims Petraeus will fare no better because he is “mentally worn out” and points to his fainting spell last week during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Showing posts with label Obama. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Obama. Show all posts
Friday, June 25, 2010
Obama relieves McChrystal, but smoke means fire
According to this week’s headlines Obama relieved General Stanley McChrystal who had been recalled to Washington this week for allegedly criticizing colleagues and administration officials in comments he made to Michael Hastings, the author of a recently published Rolling Stone article.
Obama has been waiting for an excuse to fire McChrystal since shortly after appointing him to head the war in Afghanistan and then realizing McChrystal has forgotten more about warfare and insurgencies than Obama’s advisers Biden and Holbrooke could ever hope to know in a lifetime. There has always been a disconnect between McChrystal and Obama, which was made even wider when McChrystal submitted his request for additional troops in order to properly execute the counterinsurgency effort initiated by Petraeus when he was appointed commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). Both Biden and Holbrooke opposed the strategy outlined by McChrystal and Petraeus; Biden even composed his own counterinsurgency strategy, which was a clumsy and amateur effort at playing army by the vice president.
The reason given for his firing, according to a CNN article, is that “McChrystal’s remarks…undermined the civilian control of the military ‘at the core of our democratic system’.” However, none of the individuals at the butt of the mockery are legally part of the military’s chain of command; therefore, they have no constitutional authority or control over the military. The individuals named in the article, Gen. (Ret.) James Jones, Obama’s National Security Advisor; Vice President Joe Biden; U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry; and Richard Holbrooke, the senior State Department official assigned to Afghanistan and Pakistan, are all advisers to Obama, but do not control any part of the military. The chain of command goes from the commander on the ground, in this case Gen. McChrystal, through the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, to the President. Nowhere in that list does the name of Biden, Jones, Eikenberry, or Holbrooke fall. This may simply be a case of semantics, but if the president is going to relieve a commanding general during a time of war, he should at least do so based on facts and not simply on emotion.
The fact that Obama’s key advisers were derided by senior military leaders potentially reflects the low regard in which his decision-making abilities are held, and is the reason the General was relieved. Supposedly, Gen. McChrystal and his staff ridiculed Obama’s “national security team with locker-room bravado.” But there must be a reason the General and his staff made these comments. Usually, where there is smoke there is fire. In other words, the top military commanders who interact on a regular basis with the Commander-in-Chief must know something that the rest of us do not. Additionally, if these comments reflect the low regard in which these individuals are held by the senior military leadership in Afghanistan, as a former Soldier, I can guarantee that that regard is even lower the further one travels down the chain of command, which does not bode well for how the military writ large perceives Obama’s leadership abilities, the control he has over the military, his strategic decisions, or his ability to manage our current wars.
As I wrote the other day,
[aside from Gen. (Ret.) Jones, none of Obama’s National Security team has military, much less combat, experience. Obama has surrounded himself with theoreticians, academicians, and wishful thinkers as opposed to experienced doers, which explains his dithering on the decision of whether or not to send additional troops as requested last year by General Petraeus. It is no wonder Holbrooke has yet to “lay out clear goals for the region,” especially since he assigns critical positions to kids such as Ronan Farrow, who was only 21-years old when appointed as a Special Adviser for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I do not care how book smart a person is, or if that person was considered a child prodigy and entered college as soon as emerging from the womb, unless a person has the field experience, the real world familiarity with such a critical issue, book smarts do not cut it.]
Obama set the stage for how the wars would be managed, or not managed, and forecasted his relationship with the military leadership shortly after taking office. He procrastinated on the “strategic review” and the decision to meet the personnel requirements of his commanders on the ground, McChrystal and Petraeus, thus calling in to question their experience and motives. The General tapped to fill the void in the wake of McChrystal’s firing, David Petraeus, was the one who submitted the request for additional personnel to accomplish the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan back in 2009—a strategy based on lessons learned from his successful effort in Iraq. Obviously Obama has more regard for the advice of his civilian advisers, Holbrooke, Eikenberry, and Biden and Gen. Petraeus should tread cautiously into McChrystal’s role. Petraeus would be wise to remember his strategy in Iraq was implemented under Bush. If he fails to toe the line and agree with the doctrine outlined by the inexperienced, civilian advisers content to play army with other peoples’ lives, he also may find himself on the front page of liberal newspapers with headlines proclaiming Obama’s superior decision-making ability. If immediately firing someone is the epitome of great decision-making, then every Burger King manager who has fired someone during the lunch rush should be similarly heralded in the media.
Though the military is not supposed to be political or have politically-biased views of the administration in charge does not mean they do not harbor these views and feelings behind the office doors or in the barracks rooms on a Friday night. The majority of the military is contemptuous of the control Obama has over the military and is wary of his leadership abilities. It is for this reason that Obama’s backers and most of the liberal media are painting his firing of McChrystal as “a prime example of strong and decisive leadership.” They need to divert attention away from the real problem, Obama’s lack of command presence and general strategic knowledge, which are both a result of not having enough military experience in his inner circle. The New York Times, writing “[Obama] appears deliberative and open to debate, but in the end, is coldly decisive,” made his decision seem equivalent to Kennedy’s decision to blockade Cuba or Reagan’s decision to replace the air traffic controllers. Yet it took Obama almost half a year, during a critical period in the war, to make the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan. Firing a general does not an Alexander the Great, or Kennedy or Reagan, make.
Why are these media outlets not digging deeper for the reasons why McChrystal and his aides made these comments? Usually where there is smoke there is fire. There is obviously a problem between the Obama administration and the military. Many lessons have been written of the White House’s involvement in the Vietnam War—particularly the lessons about too much civilian involvement in war decisions. Even more recent, there are crucial lessons to be learned from the Bush administration and the meddling by Rumsfeld and his lackeys at the Department of Defense. Evidently those lessons have not been learned by those occupying similar positions today. Is it right that an inexperienced president and his “yes men” advisers are allowed to continue to force their will on our military, even if they are legally allowed to do so, without having their decisions or experience called into question by those who are ultimately responsible for carrying them out? Should the military sit idly by while civilian leadership allows the nine-years we have invested in Afghanistan with blood, sweat, and tears to amount to nothing? At the end of the day, like we saw in Iraq, even if civilian leadership or advisers in DC are the ones calling the shots, it will be the generals who pay with their career and the Grunts and Leathernecks on the ground who pay with their lives.
Obama has been waiting for an excuse to fire McChrystal since shortly after appointing him to head the war in Afghanistan and then realizing McChrystal has forgotten more about warfare and insurgencies than Obama’s advisers Biden and Holbrooke could ever hope to know in a lifetime. There has always been a disconnect between McChrystal and Obama, which was made even wider when McChrystal submitted his request for additional troops in order to properly execute the counterinsurgency effort initiated by Petraeus when he was appointed commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). Both Biden and Holbrooke opposed the strategy outlined by McChrystal and Petraeus; Biden even composed his own counterinsurgency strategy, which was a clumsy and amateur effort at playing army by the vice president.
The reason given for his firing, according to a CNN article, is that “McChrystal’s remarks…undermined the civilian control of the military ‘at the core of our democratic system’.” However, none of the individuals at the butt of the mockery are legally part of the military’s chain of command; therefore, they have no constitutional authority or control over the military. The individuals named in the article, Gen. (Ret.) James Jones, Obama’s National Security Advisor; Vice President Joe Biden; U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry; and Richard Holbrooke, the senior State Department official assigned to Afghanistan and Pakistan, are all advisers to Obama, but do not control any part of the military. The chain of command goes from the commander on the ground, in this case Gen. McChrystal, through the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, to the President. Nowhere in that list does the name of Biden, Jones, Eikenberry, or Holbrooke fall. This may simply be a case of semantics, but if the president is going to relieve a commanding general during a time of war, he should at least do so based on facts and not simply on emotion.
The fact that Obama’s key advisers were derided by senior military leaders potentially reflects the low regard in which his decision-making abilities are held, and is the reason the General was relieved. Supposedly, Gen. McChrystal and his staff ridiculed Obama’s “national security team with locker-room bravado.” But there must be a reason the General and his staff made these comments. Usually, where there is smoke there is fire. In other words, the top military commanders who interact on a regular basis with the Commander-in-Chief must know something that the rest of us do not. Additionally, if these comments reflect the low regard in which these individuals are held by the senior military leadership in Afghanistan, as a former Soldier, I can guarantee that that regard is even lower the further one travels down the chain of command, which does not bode well for how the military writ large perceives Obama’s leadership abilities, the control he has over the military, his strategic decisions, or his ability to manage our current wars.
As I wrote the other day,
[aside from Gen. (Ret.) Jones, none of Obama’s National Security team has military, much less combat, experience. Obama has surrounded himself with theoreticians, academicians, and wishful thinkers as opposed to experienced doers, which explains his dithering on the decision of whether or not to send additional troops as requested last year by General Petraeus. It is no wonder Holbrooke has yet to “lay out clear goals for the region,” especially since he assigns critical positions to kids such as Ronan Farrow, who was only 21-years old when appointed as a Special Adviser for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I do not care how book smart a person is, or if that person was considered a child prodigy and entered college as soon as emerging from the womb, unless a person has the field experience, the real world familiarity with such a critical issue, book smarts do not cut it.]
Obama set the stage for how the wars would be managed, or not managed, and forecasted his relationship with the military leadership shortly after taking office. He procrastinated on the “strategic review” and the decision to meet the personnel requirements of his commanders on the ground, McChrystal and Petraeus, thus calling in to question their experience and motives. The General tapped to fill the void in the wake of McChrystal’s firing, David Petraeus, was the one who submitted the request for additional personnel to accomplish the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan back in 2009—a strategy based on lessons learned from his successful effort in Iraq. Obviously Obama has more regard for the advice of his civilian advisers, Holbrooke, Eikenberry, and Biden and Gen. Petraeus should tread cautiously into McChrystal’s role. Petraeus would be wise to remember his strategy in Iraq was implemented under Bush. If he fails to toe the line and agree with the doctrine outlined by the inexperienced, civilian advisers content to play army with other peoples’ lives, he also may find himself on the front page of liberal newspapers with headlines proclaiming Obama’s superior decision-making ability. If immediately firing someone is the epitome of great decision-making, then every Burger King manager who has fired someone during the lunch rush should be similarly heralded in the media.
Though the military is not supposed to be political or have politically-biased views of the administration in charge does not mean they do not harbor these views and feelings behind the office doors or in the barracks rooms on a Friday night. The majority of the military is contemptuous of the control Obama has over the military and is wary of his leadership abilities. It is for this reason that Obama’s backers and most of the liberal media are painting his firing of McChrystal as “a prime example of strong and decisive leadership.” They need to divert attention away from the real problem, Obama’s lack of command presence and general strategic knowledge, which are both a result of not having enough military experience in his inner circle. The New York Times, writing “[Obama] appears deliberative and open to debate, but in the end, is coldly decisive,” made his decision seem equivalent to Kennedy’s decision to blockade Cuba or Reagan’s decision to replace the air traffic controllers. Yet it took Obama almost half a year, during a critical period in the war, to make the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan. Firing a general does not an Alexander the Great, or Kennedy or Reagan, make.
Why are these media outlets not digging deeper for the reasons why McChrystal and his aides made these comments? Usually where there is smoke there is fire. There is obviously a problem between the Obama administration and the military. Many lessons have been written of the White House’s involvement in the Vietnam War—particularly the lessons about too much civilian involvement in war decisions. Even more recent, there are crucial lessons to be learned from the Bush administration and the meddling by Rumsfeld and his lackeys at the Department of Defense. Evidently those lessons have not been learned by those occupying similar positions today. Is it right that an inexperienced president and his “yes men” advisers are allowed to continue to force their will on our military, even if they are legally allowed to do so, without having their decisions or experience called into question by those who are ultimately responsible for carrying them out? Should the military sit idly by while civilian leadership allows the nine-years we have invested in Afghanistan with blood, sweat, and tears to amount to nothing? At the end of the day, like we saw in Iraq, even if civilian leadership or advisers in DC are the ones calling the shots, it will be the generals who pay with their career and the Grunts and Leathernecks on the ground who pay with their lives.
Sunday, May 23, 2010
Homeland Security Funding: One Fine Pig!
I must warn you, the reader, this blog entry is one of my longer posts. It is not without reason though; the problem addressed below is a complex one, an issue that has not been adequately addressed in almost a decade, and one which if not addressed will come under scrutiny by Congress after the next terrorist attack as if no one knew about it. Here is their warning.
Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11 departments and agencies at all levels of government charged with counterterrorism have been vigilantly awaiting the next attack. They are realists; they understand it is not a matter of if, but of when and how big. We have seen a few botched opportunities, Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and most recently Faisal Shahzad. There have even been a few successful, albeit low-tech, attacks, such as Carlos Leon Bledsoe who shot two Soldiers in front of a recruiting station in Little Rock and the Ft. Hood shooter Nidal Hasan.
Part of the federal government’s counterterror program includes providing funds, hundreds of billions of dollars since 9/11, to high-risk cities and regions. The way the risk is determined is based on a simple methodological process whereby analysts evaluate the threat to that city (TA), the criticality of infrastructure / key resources in or near the city (CA), this includes population density, and the city’s major vulnerabilities (VA).* This is a standard methodological approach to assessing risk and can be found in almost all risk assessments regardless of the topic; terrorism, business continuity, disaster preparedness, and emergency management, just to name a few. Some of the most “out-of-the-box” thinkers have even adapted it to areas such as business development and operations management.
* The formula is usually rendered as RA = TA + CA + VA.
Last week New York City Mayor Bloomberg complained his “city is continually shortchanged on anti-terror funding given the threats it faces.” Bloomberg and other politicians, such as NY Rep. (R-L.I.) Pete King, the ranking member on the House Homeland Security Committee, feel that New York City should receive most of the homeland security money and that, because they are not, then Obama and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano must not be doing their jobs.** Of course, Bloomberg failed to mention that just one week before the attempted bombing of Times Square he had been set to lay-off almost a thousand NYC police officers. He has since changed his mind.
**According to Obama and Napolitano, the money has been provided; New York City officials have just not accessed it and put it to use.
The problem
Once a risk assessment is conducted it should be used to develop a prioritized list of the most high-risk cities so that federal funding can be allocated accordingly. Ideally this process is apolitical and not subject to human interference, if done properly and according to the methodology in place. However, at the end of the day the process involves the distribution of money. Herein lays the problem. In politics money equals power. The more money a politician brings to their constituents the more jobs can be kept or created and the better chance that politician has of being re-elected. Of course the politicians do not couch it in that language. They use the language of fear, claiming their city is the biggest terrorist target or has the most important infrastructure or vulnerabilities.
With the Bush administration still reeling from 9/11, a number of so-called “terrorism experts” began to appear as talking heads on cable news shows and providing testimony to Congressional committees. The majority of these “experts” were long-time law enforcement officers with maybe, if they were lucky, a short term assignment to a terrorism investigation some time in their career or they were long-time academicians who maybe wrote a book or a few magazine articles on the Palestinian-Israeli problem; almost none were true experts, current or former State Department or U.S. military personnel with real counterterrorism experience. Each of these “experts” had their own view on al-Qa`ida, bin Laden, and terrorism in general. Like all politicians, in an effort to demonstrate to the American public that he was taking some sort of action to keep another attack from happening, the Bush administration simply began to throw money at the problem based on the information or recommendations of these “experts” instead of thinking through the problem and developing a comprehensive national antiterrorism program. Instead, every “expert” that recommended a course of action or a new program saw money thrown into their project, with most never getting started, not meeting expectations, or becoming obsolete, either because of advances in technology or changes in al-Qa`ida’s tactics, by the time they were implemented. Since 9/11, and not even counting Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has witnessed probably the largest example of governmental waste, fraud, and abuse in our nation’s history—and we continue to experience terrorist plots and attempts, the last few of which were foiled solely by good old American luck.
Besides the failure of the Bush, and subsequently the Obama, administration to establish a comprehensive program for homeland security funding, another, even larger problem, has been the power members of Congress have over not only their respective committees, but their ability to re-allocate monies in the federal budget to pet projects; known colloquially as “pork.” This type of effort is usually done at the behest of lobbyists or special interest groups. For example, in January the Heritage Foundation published an article by Matt Mayer who reported “Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Conn., covertly slipped a provision into the [DHS] appropriation bill” that essentially re-allocated $4.5 million, which was initially earmarked for TSA “screening operations and…explosive detection systems,” to “an ineffective [FEMA] grant program for firefighters.” Dodd did this only five months before Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up a Northwest flight on Christmas Day last year, a flight he succeeded in boarding due to ineffective screening. While firefighters are an important part to terrorism response, the original focus of the money was on terrorism prevention—something still relatively new in the U.S.—firefighting is part of disaster response and is in place whether there are terrorists or not. Dodd was willing to risk the murder of hundreds of people simply to please a special interest group, in this case the International Association of Fire Fighters. Does anyone really believe if Abdulmutallab succeeded in killing everyone on that flight that politicians like Sen. Dodd would be hauled before a Congressional committee to answer for his “pork” project? The answer is no, it would never happen. I suppose Dodd would have reassured himself that even if those people were killed the firefighters would have been there to put out the flames.
Every year billions of dollars are provided to cities to develop or enhance their security and response capabilities; however, almost a decade after the attacks some major cities still lack basic antiterrorism security equipment and response plans. It begs the question, what have they been doing with the money? The Department of Defense (DOD) has required certain antiterrorism measures on all of their military bases since the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Two key elements of the DOD program, known officially as the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) program, are 1) every installation initially received a similar package of security and response equipment regardless of their size and 2) every installation receives a vulnerability assessment every three years. It does not matter if the base consists of 100 people or 50,000 people, the initial baseline package was the same. This package consisted of things like barriers for entrances, booths for security forces, and other items.*** The larger bases obviously received more of each type. Every three years one of the JSIVA teams visits the base and assesses things like physical security, information security, operational security, intelligence capabilities and processes, the base’s threat assessment process, emergency preparedness, and disaster response readiness. A final report is then written outlining both best practices and major vulnerabilities; recommendations on how to mitigate or eliminate those vulnerabilities are also provided in the report. Commanders are then able to properly and effectively conduct a comprehensive risk assessment so that they can consciously determine where they can safely assume the least risk and to what problem areas their limited money and equipment needs to be applied. This sounds like something that our large cities, by all accounts our biggest targets, should have done at least once in the past nine years. But according to Mayer’s article, “we have no real idea whether the billions spent have made us safer because DHS has failed to do a comprehensive capabilities assessment since 2003.” According to a body of media reporting documented cases of the misuse of homeland security funds “have included small communities using these defense funds for everything from repairing pot holes to cleaning parks.” Not really the types of things that will stop terrorists, except for maybe the potholes; they could slow the terrorists down as they drive their car bomb to the target. Or better yet, maybe if the terrorists hit the holes hard enough it could set the bomb off killing them.
***While listing antiterrorism equipment and their uses is not classified, or even sensitive, unless the installation and its specific vulnerabilities are also listed I will refrain from doing so here simply as an operational security measure.
But it is not just up to DHS. The cities, in order to continue to receive federal money, should be required to show their major vulnerabilities that still need to be mitigated or eliminated. Then the following year DHS will be able to see if the money provided to the cities was properly allocated or simply wasted. We have so many other programs where states and cities are required to demonstrate sufficient progress in order to continue receiving federal funds, but we do not have one that requires them to demonstrate they are protecting their citizens from terrorists?
The solution
Terrorism funding is not and should not be based solely on threat. If this were the case, New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles would get all the money every year. As a result, the terrorists would simply move on to the next, softer, target and counterterror authorities would have to start all over with politicians calling for hearings on Capitol Hill and wanting to know why the new target was not protected and demanding someone be held accountable, when, in all reality, most of the blame in that instance would reside in offices on Capitol Hill, in Congress.
During these trying economic times most locales are facing budget and money woes. It is for this reason that cities must employ experienced risk managers, familiar with the topic of terrorism, to develop and implement a risk assessment program for the city so that antiterror and counterterror funding can be properly allocated. Most major cities have such a position in place; however, they usually have no real authority. This should be changed so that this position has a say in security and emergency response budget considerations. Ideally this person would be the security and disaster response chief and would be in charge of police, fire, EMS, and other offices charged with security or emergency management.
A risk assessment process should be implemented with an annual audit required, similar to the JSIVA assessments done by DOD. The city should be required to do this annually, or at least bi-annually, with an outside agency, ideally DHS, conducting one every five years. DHS has the framework in place—every state has or will have at least one Protective Security Advisor (PSA), at least one fusion center with at least one intelligence analyst, and a number of other DHS personnel (i.e. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and Federal Protective Service). These personnel, at least in the short-term, could be brought together in Tiger Teams that could conduct the initial risk assessments of the most critical locations.
Finally, all homeland security funding would be dependent on having these risk assessments conducted according to the proscribed methodology and schedule and politicians would have no say as to how or where these funds are spent before they are disbursed. Once the city receives its money, if it chooses to spend it on something else and the same vulnerabilities show up on consecutive assessments, that city would not receive funds, or they would receive significantly less, the following year. Of course, this would require that politicians be held accountable, something to which they are not accustomed; preferring instead to assign blame, not be blamed.
Conclusion
As with everything political the current argument between Mayor Bloomberg and the Obama administration is not new and has transcended parties and administrations. In 2005 Mayor Bloomberg had similar complaints about the Bush administration. And as long as the current processes continue the complaints and arguments will also continue. Additionally, taxpayer money will continue to be wasted and even though billions will be spent every year we will not be any safer.
This blog is not meant to be a criticism of Mayor Bloomberg or the Obama administration. On the contrary, I believe both sides are extremely concerned about the next attack and honestly wish to ensure the right people and programs are in the right place when the time comes to either stop the attack or to quickly respond to the attack thus saving untold numbers of lives. On the other hand, I do not believe the current funding processes and programs involved in selecting and prioritizing which locations receive homeland security money and how much they receive are properly implemented. I also do not believe Congress should have a role in re-allocating homeland security money simply to secure their job; however, Congressional reform, beginning with term limits for Congress, is for a future blog. For now, a better job must be done prioritizing and auditing homeland security funds.
Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11 departments and agencies at all levels of government charged with counterterrorism have been vigilantly awaiting the next attack. They are realists; they understand it is not a matter of if, but of when and how big. We have seen a few botched opportunities, Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and most recently Faisal Shahzad. There have even been a few successful, albeit low-tech, attacks, such as Carlos Leon Bledsoe who shot two Soldiers in front of a recruiting station in Little Rock and the Ft. Hood shooter Nidal Hasan.
Part of the federal government’s counterterror program includes providing funds, hundreds of billions of dollars since 9/11, to high-risk cities and regions. The way the risk is determined is based on a simple methodological process whereby analysts evaluate the threat to that city (TA), the criticality of infrastructure / key resources in or near the city (CA), this includes population density, and the city’s major vulnerabilities (VA).* This is a standard methodological approach to assessing risk and can be found in almost all risk assessments regardless of the topic; terrorism, business continuity, disaster preparedness, and emergency management, just to name a few. Some of the most “out-of-the-box” thinkers have even adapted it to areas such as business development and operations management.
* The formula is usually rendered as RA = TA + CA + VA.
Last week New York City Mayor Bloomberg complained his “city is continually shortchanged on anti-terror funding given the threats it faces.” Bloomberg and other politicians, such as NY Rep. (R-L.I.) Pete King, the ranking member on the House Homeland Security Committee, feel that New York City should receive most of the homeland security money and that, because they are not, then Obama and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano must not be doing their jobs.** Of course, Bloomberg failed to mention that just one week before the attempted bombing of Times Square he had been set to lay-off almost a thousand NYC police officers. He has since changed his mind.
**According to Obama and Napolitano, the money has been provided; New York City officials have just not accessed it and put it to use.
The problem
Once a risk assessment is conducted it should be used to develop a prioritized list of the most high-risk cities so that federal funding can be allocated accordingly. Ideally this process is apolitical and not subject to human interference, if done properly and according to the methodology in place. However, at the end of the day the process involves the distribution of money. Herein lays the problem. In politics money equals power. The more money a politician brings to their constituents the more jobs can be kept or created and the better chance that politician has of being re-elected. Of course the politicians do not couch it in that language. They use the language of fear, claiming their city is the biggest terrorist target or has the most important infrastructure or vulnerabilities.
With the Bush administration still reeling from 9/11, a number of so-called “terrorism experts” began to appear as talking heads on cable news shows and providing testimony to Congressional committees. The majority of these “experts” were long-time law enforcement officers with maybe, if they were lucky, a short term assignment to a terrorism investigation some time in their career or they were long-time academicians who maybe wrote a book or a few magazine articles on the Palestinian-Israeli problem; almost none were true experts, current or former State Department or U.S. military personnel with real counterterrorism experience. Each of these “experts” had their own view on al-Qa`ida, bin Laden, and terrorism in general. Like all politicians, in an effort to demonstrate to the American public that he was taking some sort of action to keep another attack from happening, the Bush administration simply began to throw money at the problem based on the information or recommendations of these “experts” instead of thinking through the problem and developing a comprehensive national antiterrorism program. Instead, every “expert” that recommended a course of action or a new program saw money thrown into their project, with most never getting started, not meeting expectations, or becoming obsolete, either because of advances in technology or changes in al-Qa`ida’s tactics, by the time they were implemented. Since 9/11, and not even counting Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has witnessed probably the largest example of governmental waste, fraud, and abuse in our nation’s history—and we continue to experience terrorist plots and attempts, the last few of which were foiled solely by good old American luck.
Besides the failure of the Bush, and subsequently the Obama, administration to establish a comprehensive program for homeland security funding, another, even larger problem, has been the power members of Congress have over not only their respective committees, but their ability to re-allocate monies in the federal budget to pet projects; known colloquially as “pork.” This type of effort is usually done at the behest of lobbyists or special interest groups. For example, in January the Heritage Foundation published an article by Matt Mayer who reported “Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Conn., covertly slipped a provision into the [DHS] appropriation bill” that essentially re-allocated $4.5 million, which was initially earmarked for TSA “screening operations and…explosive detection systems,” to “an ineffective [FEMA] grant program for firefighters.” Dodd did this only five months before Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up a Northwest flight on Christmas Day last year, a flight he succeeded in boarding due to ineffective screening. While firefighters are an important part to terrorism response, the original focus of the money was on terrorism prevention—something still relatively new in the U.S.—firefighting is part of disaster response and is in place whether there are terrorists or not. Dodd was willing to risk the murder of hundreds of people simply to please a special interest group, in this case the International Association of Fire Fighters. Does anyone really believe if Abdulmutallab succeeded in killing everyone on that flight that politicians like Sen. Dodd would be hauled before a Congressional committee to answer for his “pork” project? The answer is no, it would never happen. I suppose Dodd would have reassured himself that even if those people were killed the firefighters would have been there to put out the flames.
Every year billions of dollars are provided to cities to develop or enhance their security and response capabilities; however, almost a decade after the attacks some major cities still lack basic antiterrorism security equipment and response plans. It begs the question, what have they been doing with the money? The Department of Defense (DOD) has required certain antiterrorism measures on all of their military bases since the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Two key elements of the DOD program, known officially as the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) program, are 1) every installation initially received a similar package of security and response equipment regardless of their size and 2) every installation receives a vulnerability assessment every three years. It does not matter if the base consists of 100 people or 50,000 people, the initial baseline package was the same. This package consisted of things like barriers for entrances, booths for security forces, and other items.*** The larger bases obviously received more of each type. Every three years one of the JSIVA teams visits the base and assesses things like physical security, information security, operational security, intelligence capabilities and processes, the base’s threat assessment process, emergency preparedness, and disaster response readiness. A final report is then written outlining both best practices and major vulnerabilities; recommendations on how to mitigate or eliminate those vulnerabilities are also provided in the report. Commanders are then able to properly and effectively conduct a comprehensive risk assessment so that they can consciously determine where they can safely assume the least risk and to what problem areas their limited money and equipment needs to be applied. This sounds like something that our large cities, by all accounts our biggest targets, should have done at least once in the past nine years. But according to Mayer’s article, “we have no real idea whether the billions spent have made us safer because DHS has failed to do a comprehensive capabilities assessment since 2003.” According to a body of media reporting documented cases of the misuse of homeland security funds “have included small communities using these defense funds for everything from repairing pot holes to cleaning parks.” Not really the types of things that will stop terrorists, except for maybe the potholes; they could slow the terrorists down as they drive their car bomb to the target. Or better yet, maybe if the terrorists hit the holes hard enough it could set the bomb off killing them.
***While listing antiterrorism equipment and their uses is not classified, or even sensitive, unless the installation and its specific vulnerabilities are also listed I will refrain from doing so here simply as an operational security measure.
But it is not just up to DHS. The cities, in order to continue to receive federal money, should be required to show their major vulnerabilities that still need to be mitigated or eliminated. Then the following year DHS will be able to see if the money provided to the cities was properly allocated or simply wasted. We have so many other programs where states and cities are required to demonstrate sufficient progress in order to continue receiving federal funds, but we do not have one that requires them to demonstrate they are protecting their citizens from terrorists?
The solution
Terrorism funding is not and should not be based solely on threat. If this were the case, New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles would get all the money every year. As a result, the terrorists would simply move on to the next, softer, target and counterterror authorities would have to start all over with politicians calling for hearings on Capitol Hill and wanting to know why the new target was not protected and demanding someone be held accountable, when, in all reality, most of the blame in that instance would reside in offices on Capitol Hill, in Congress.
During these trying economic times most locales are facing budget and money woes. It is for this reason that cities must employ experienced risk managers, familiar with the topic of terrorism, to develop and implement a risk assessment program for the city so that antiterror and counterterror funding can be properly allocated. Most major cities have such a position in place; however, they usually have no real authority. This should be changed so that this position has a say in security and emergency response budget considerations. Ideally this person would be the security and disaster response chief and would be in charge of police, fire, EMS, and other offices charged with security or emergency management.
A risk assessment process should be implemented with an annual audit required, similar to the JSIVA assessments done by DOD. The city should be required to do this annually, or at least bi-annually, with an outside agency, ideally DHS, conducting one every five years. DHS has the framework in place—every state has or will have at least one Protective Security Advisor (PSA), at least one fusion center with at least one intelligence analyst, and a number of other DHS personnel (i.e. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and Federal Protective Service). These personnel, at least in the short-term, could be brought together in Tiger Teams that could conduct the initial risk assessments of the most critical locations.
Finally, all homeland security funding would be dependent on having these risk assessments conducted according to the proscribed methodology and schedule and politicians would have no say as to how or where these funds are spent before they are disbursed. Once the city receives its money, if it chooses to spend it on something else and the same vulnerabilities show up on consecutive assessments, that city would not receive funds, or they would receive significantly less, the following year. Of course, this would require that politicians be held accountable, something to which they are not accustomed; preferring instead to assign blame, not be blamed.
Conclusion
As with everything political the current argument between Mayor Bloomberg and the Obama administration is not new and has transcended parties and administrations. In 2005 Mayor Bloomberg had similar complaints about the Bush administration. And as long as the current processes continue the complaints and arguments will also continue. Additionally, taxpayer money will continue to be wasted and even though billions will be spent every year we will not be any safer.
This blog is not meant to be a criticism of Mayor Bloomberg or the Obama administration. On the contrary, I believe both sides are extremely concerned about the next attack and honestly wish to ensure the right people and programs are in the right place when the time comes to either stop the attack or to quickly respond to the attack thus saving untold numbers of lives. On the other hand, I do not believe the current funding processes and programs involved in selecting and prioritizing which locations receive homeland security money and how much they receive are properly implemented. I also do not believe Congress should have a role in re-allocating homeland security money simply to secure their job; however, Congressional reform, beginning with term limits for Congress, is for a future blog. For now, a better job must be done prioritizing and auditing homeland security funds.
Monday, October 26, 2009
An opinion: A bold, decisive strategy for Afghanistan
“The world is a dangerous place, not because of those that do evil, but because of those that look on and do nothing.” Albert Einstein
President Obama has had Gen. McChrystal’s request for troops for almost two months. Two months in a war that has been going on for eight years; has his senior staff not had enough time to determine what tract to take? Did he not have answers for the war during the debates with Sen. McCain?
We have all heard the calls for President Obama to provide the necessary troops for Gen. McChrystal in Afghanistan. We have also heard about the need to re-think the strategy in Afghanistan. I, for one, never criticize a strategy or plan without offering an alternative, so Mr. President, here it is.
First, and foremost, provide the troops, and possibly increase the number by another 10,000, for Gen. McChrystal. If the General feels we may still lose with 40,000 then give him 50,000 and be ready to give him more after that. You and your administration act as if we need to save our military for a rainy day; if the Taliban and al-Qa`ida take over in Afghanistan, it will be worse than a rainy day. You yourself said this was the “necessary war,” so act like it. I understand none of your administration, save possibly for Gen. Jones, possess the military acuity of Gens. McChrystal or Petraeus, therefore, it is they who you should turn for advice.
Second, establish some key, attainable, definable objectives for our military. Our military will fight and they will win; if you give them the resources and tell them exactly what you want. Instead, they are hearing ridiculous ideas, like those promoted by your Vice President, about how we need to separate the Taliban from al-Qa`ida and fight a counterterrorism war instead of a counterinsurgency one; pull back from the outlying areas to protect the bigger cities and simply rely on Predators and other stand-off weapons to take out key al-Qa`ida leadership. Maybe they need to ask the Russians how that plan worked out for them twenty-five years ago or better yet, ask former President Clinton and the widows, widowers, and orphans of the USS Cole attack and 9/11. You must have reliable sources on the ground to provide actionable information to our intelligence services in order to properly execute a strike. If you withdraw the military from the outlying areas and do not provide the requisite number of troops, you risk losing valuable gatherers of information.
Since before 9/11, when former President Clinton first shot cruise missiles into Afghan dirt, the Taliban and al-Qa`ida have been bedfellows. Mullah Omar and his bearded Talib would not give bin Laden up then, they did not vote him out of the cave after 9/11 or after we invaded in 2003, there is no way they are going to lose face and do so now just because you ask them nicely or stop killing their senior leaders with Predators. They will simply take that as a sign of weakness, like we know we cannot beat them so we are trying to cut our losses. I, for one, am glad VP Biden did not come into office after Kasserine Pass in World War II or we might still have to contend with a Nazi Germany.
Third, keep what we take. Our Marines in Helmand Province have remarked that there are places in the province that they have gone into three or four times, kicked out the Taliban, and then left, only to return some weeks or months later and do it all again. Unfortunately, this only makes us look like idiots. No one is ever going to cooperate with us if they know we are just going to leave and let the Taliban come back and kill everyone that collaborated with us; just read Stephen Grey’s article, “Morale dips for American Marines in Afghanistan.” If you or your aides ever bothered to study our first and only defeat you would know that’s Vietnam 101.
As I mentioned earlier this week, there are four objectives that need to be considered; secure the Afghan government, provide security for the Afghan people, deny the Taliban and al-Qa`ida space to operate and plan external terrorist operations, or completely eliminate the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. However, there is no way we can accomplish them concurrently. Therefore, you need to pick one; whichever one you and your military advisers think is the most crucial. Succeeding in one will ultimately lead to success in others. The problem with former President Bush’s strategy was that, like his other strategies, it was vague and tried to do too much at once. We must start small. Remember, no one has ever truly ruled Afghanistan. Maybe they owned the major population centers, but not the entire country. Afghanistan is a tribal culture built on villages and governed locally; we need to think small. Not in terms of troop strength, but in terms of building Afghanistan into a safe country that refuses to allow the Taliban and al-Qa`ida to operate anywhere in the country.
President Obama has had Gen. McChrystal’s request for troops for almost two months. Two months in a war that has been going on for eight years; has his senior staff not had enough time to determine what tract to take? Did he not have answers for the war during the debates with Sen. McCain?
We have all heard the calls for President Obama to provide the necessary troops for Gen. McChrystal in Afghanistan. We have also heard about the need to re-think the strategy in Afghanistan. I, for one, never criticize a strategy or plan without offering an alternative, so Mr. President, here it is.
First, and foremost, provide the troops, and possibly increase the number by another 10,000, for Gen. McChrystal. If the General feels we may still lose with 40,000 then give him 50,000 and be ready to give him more after that. You and your administration act as if we need to save our military for a rainy day; if the Taliban and al-Qa`ida take over in Afghanistan, it will be worse than a rainy day. You yourself said this was the “necessary war,” so act like it. I understand none of your administration, save possibly for Gen. Jones, possess the military acuity of Gens. McChrystal or Petraeus, therefore, it is they who you should turn for advice.
Second, establish some key, attainable, definable objectives for our military. Our military will fight and they will win; if you give them the resources and tell them exactly what you want. Instead, they are hearing ridiculous ideas, like those promoted by your Vice President, about how we need to separate the Taliban from al-Qa`ida and fight a counterterrorism war instead of a counterinsurgency one; pull back from the outlying areas to protect the bigger cities and simply rely on Predators and other stand-off weapons to take out key al-Qa`ida leadership. Maybe they need to ask the Russians how that plan worked out for them twenty-five years ago or better yet, ask former President Clinton and the widows, widowers, and orphans of the USS Cole attack and 9/11. You must have reliable sources on the ground to provide actionable information to our intelligence services in order to properly execute a strike. If you withdraw the military from the outlying areas and do not provide the requisite number of troops, you risk losing valuable gatherers of information.
Since before 9/11, when former President Clinton first shot cruise missiles into Afghan dirt, the Taliban and al-Qa`ida have been bedfellows. Mullah Omar and his bearded Talib would not give bin Laden up then, they did not vote him out of the cave after 9/11 or after we invaded in 2003, there is no way they are going to lose face and do so now just because you ask them nicely or stop killing their senior leaders with Predators. They will simply take that as a sign of weakness, like we know we cannot beat them so we are trying to cut our losses. I, for one, am glad VP Biden did not come into office after Kasserine Pass in World War II or we might still have to contend with a Nazi Germany.
Third, keep what we take. Our Marines in Helmand Province have remarked that there are places in the province that they have gone into three or four times, kicked out the Taliban, and then left, only to return some weeks or months later and do it all again. Unfortunately, this only makes us look like idiots. No one is ever going to cooperate with us if they know we are just going to leave and let the Taliban come back and kill everyone that collaborated with us; just read Stephen Grey’s article, “Morale dips for American Marines in Afghanistan.” If you or your aides ever bothered to study our first and only defeat you would know that’s Vietnam 101.
As I mentioned earlier this week, there are four objectives that need to be considered; secure the Afghan government, provide security for the Afghan people, deny the Taliban and al-Qa`ida space to operate and plan external terrorist operations, or completely eliminate the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. However, there is no way we can accomplish them concurrently. Therefore, you need to pick one; whichever one you and your military advisers think is the most crucial. Succeeding in one will ultimately lead to success in others. The problem with former President Bush’s strategy was that, like his other strategies, it was vague and tried to do too much at once. We must start small. Remember, no one has ever truly ruled Afghanistan. Maybe they owned the major population centers, but not the entire country. Afghanistan is a tribal culture built on villages and governed locally; we need to think small. Not in terms of troop strength, but in terms of building Afghanistan into a safe country that refuses to allow the Taliban and al-Qa`ida to operate anywhere in the country.
Friday, October 23, 2009
We need a new strategy in Afghanistan
The president needs to re-assess the current strategy for Afghanistan. In essence, the strategic objectives given to Gen. McChrystal when he assumed command in May are vague and unattainable without a change in resources on the ground. This is a key reason Gen. McChrystal is requesting additional troops; to implement the strategy outlined back in March. That strategy was doomed from the beginning. It asserts that our strategic goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa`ida and its safehavens. However, it does not define what those terms, disrupt, dismantle, defeat, mean nor does it says anything about the Taliban.
There are basically four, very different and very important objectives that need to be considered; secure the Afghan government, provide security for the Afghan people, deny the Taliban and al-Qa`ida space to operate and plan external terrorist operations, or completely eliminate the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. These are all very diverse objectives that require different configurations of military and diplomatic forces. Though achieving one objective can lead to the success of another, we cannot accomplish them all simultaneously. Clearly identifying which objective has priority is the first thing the president must do.
One of President Obama’s promises during the presidential campaign was a more transparent government. However, after Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s public comments on his need for additional troops in Afghanistan, we saw a flurry of activity, to include a speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates where he essentially admonished the General for publicly advocating additional troops and comments by President Obama’s National Security Adviser, retired Marine Corps General James Jones, who also came out against Gen. McChrystal’s comments, stating that military commanders need to respect the chain of command and provide any advice through it and not the media.
These statements and the failure by President Obama to immediately approve Gen. McChrystal’s request for additional troops are indicative of not only indecisiveness, but, more importantly, are reflective of the fact that the strategy outlined by the Obama administration back in March has not been successful due to a lack of resources and insight.
For example, it states, “we will fully resource our efforts to train and support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).” The way the strategy is written it makes one think these are both viable entities simply lacking some training and resources, which is completely inaccurate. Neither of these organizations is effective in either providing security for the Afghan people or taking on the Taliban. Also, like the rest of the Afghan government, they are completely corrupt. As a result, U.S. troops are needed to not only provide training, but also to execute the missions these organizations should be carrying out until such a time as they are dependably staffed and able to effectively conduct the missions. Unfortunately, most experts agree it will take generations to effectively root out the pervasive corruption in Afghan governmental organizations.
President Obama handpicked Gen. McChrystal back in May for a reason; because of the General’s vast experience in counterinsurgency and special operations. That is also a key reason why Gen. Petraeus was appointed the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Those two men alone have more military and combat experience than President Obama’s entire cabinet combined and for him to essentially ignore their recommendation on how best to achieve the current strategy is blatantly calling that experience into question.
The Afghan people, for the most part, are simple and hardworking people that only want to tend to their fields or go to their job, make a decent wage, return home at the end of the day, and raise their families, all in a secure and peaceful Afghanistan. They do not want to attack America, but at the same time they are not looking for a Western-style democracy or American values; they want to maintain their own culture and identity. Unfortunately, in order to provide some semblance of peacefulness, American troops are required to provide security for the fields, the cities, the State Department U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) workers out helping to build dams and roads and other infrastructure projects the Afghans sorely need.
President Obama’s March strategy made one other significant point; the “new approach will be flexible and adoptive and include frequent evaluations of the progress being made.” Maybe the president and his advisers need to go back and re-read that part of the strategy.
There are basically four, very different and very important objectives that need to be considered; secure the Afghan government, provide security for the Afghan people, deny the Taliban and al-Qa`ida space to operate and plan external terrorist operations, or completely eliminate the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. These are all very diverse objectives that require different configurations of military and diplomatic forces. Though achieving one objective can lead to the success of another, we cannot accomplish them all simultaneously. Clearly identifying which objective has priority is the first thing the president must do.
One of President Obama’s promises during the presidential campaign was a more transparent government. However, after Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s public comments on his need for additional troops in Afghanistan, we saw a flurry of activity, to include a speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates where he essentially admonished the General for publicly advocating additional troops and comments by President Obama’s National Security Adviser, retired Marine Corps General James Jones, who also came out against Gen. McChrystal’s comments, stating that military commanders need to respect the chain of command and provide any advice through it and not the media.
These statements and the failure by President Obama to immediately approve Gen. McChrystal’s request for additional troops are indicative of not only indecisiveness, but, more importantly, are reflective of the fact that the strategy outlined by the Obama administration back in March has not been successful due to a lack of resources and insight.
For example, it states, “we will fully resource our efforts to train and support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).” The way the strategy is written it makes one think these are both viable entities simply lacking some training and resources, which is completely inaccurate. Neither of these organizations is effective in either providing security for the Afghan people or taking on the Taliban. Also, like the rest of the Afghan government, they are completely corrupt. As a result, U.S. troops are needed to not only provide training, but also to execute the missions these organizations should be carrying out until such a time as they are dependably staffed and able to effectively conduct the missions. Unfortunately, most experts agree it will take generations to effectively root out the pervasive corruption in Afghan governmental organizations.
President Obama handpicked Gen. McChrystal back in May for a reason; because of the General’s vast experience in counterinsurgency and special operations. That is also a key reason why Gen. Petraeus was appointed the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Those two men alone have more military and combat experience than President Obama’s entire cabinet combined and for him to essentially ignore their recommendation on how best to achieve the current strategy is blatantly calling that experience into question.
The Afghan people, for the most part, are simple and hardworking people that only want to tend to their fields or go to their job, make a decent wage, return home at the end of the day, and raise their families, all in a secure and peaceful Afghanistan. They do not want to attack America, but at the same time they are not looking for a Western-style democracy or American values; they want to maintain their own culture and identity. Unfortunately, in order to provide some semblance of peacefulness, American troops are required to provide security for the fields, the cities, the State Department U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) workers out helping to build dams and roads and other infrastructure projects the Afghans sorely need.
President Obama’s March strategy made one other significant point; the “new approach will be flexible and adoptive and include frequent evaluations of the progress being made.” Maybe the president and his advisers need to go back and re-read that part of the strategy.
Thursday, October 22, 2009
President Obama, listen to your Generals
The Obama administration needs to stop waffling and order the increase in troops that the commander on the ground, Gen. McChrystal, has requested for Afghanistan. We have heard the talking-heads making the arguments for and against the increase; however, their primary focus has been to criticize the military for supposedly leaking Gen. McChrystal’s assessment or on the alleged rift between Obama and the military instead of on the real issues at hand, the safety of American and allied troops and the security of the Homeland.
President Obama’s senior aides, such as Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, claim he is weighing all the options and studying the situation before deciding to commit, or not commit, more troops to the fight in Afghanistan. That indicates that President Obama is not listening to those with the requisite experience and that are in the best positions to provide the most accurate recommendations; his chief military advisors, the Secretary of Defense and his handpicked commander on the ground. Considering the advice of anyone else, such as his Chief of Staff, who has never served in the military, or, even less reputable, the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, is simply preposterous since they do not have the background and are not in positions to provide the most accurate information to allow the president to make critical, military decisions in a timely manner.
Joe Klein stated in his blog, “a quick decision is not a good idea” until the Afghan elections are resolved to allow President Obama time to see “what the next Afghan governmnet [sic] is going to look like” as well as to see if our allies, the Canadians, British, Australians, and Dutch, will remain steadfast. Unfortunately, our allies are waiting for President Obama to make his decision; if he wavers and fails to meet the requirements outlined by Gen. McChrystal, it will indicate to our allies that he is no longer stalwart in his support for the “necessary war” and they will see no need to continue their support for the mission. Furthermore, not only will it signal to our allies, rightly or wrongly, that we are no longer sure of the fight, it will signal the same to our enemies, the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, and to our main ally in the region, Pakistan.
This indecisiveness and, more importantly, the failure to provide the required troops, will embolden our enemies at a crucial time in the war. The enemy could care less who sits in the president’s office in Kabul; they will not put the war on hold until a run-off election is held. Furthermore, unlike the Obama administration’s running of the war, they are quite sure of their objective, destroy everyone not adhering to their violently radical version of Islam, take over Afghanistan, install an extremely violent, perverted version of shari`a, then take the fight to America.
The longer President Obama takes to reinforce Gen. McChrystal, the more indecisive he seems and the quicker the enemy will seize the initiative, thus giving the advantage to the enemy as they will interpret the president's lack of resolve as a reflection of American society writ large, much like the North Vietnamese did after 1968, and use it to drive a wedge between the military and the American people, with the Obama White House in the middle.
President Obama’s senior aides, such as Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, claim he is weighing all the options and studying the situation before deciding to commit, or not commit, more troops to the fight in Afghanistan. That indicates that President Obama is not listening to those with the requisite experience and that are in the best positions to provide the most accurate recommendations; his chief military advisors, the Secretary of Defense and his handpicked commander on the ground. Considering the advice of anyone else, such as his Chief of Staff, who has never served in the military, or, even less reputable, the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, is simply preposterous since they do not have the background and are not in positions to provide the most accurate information to allow the president to make critical, military decisions in a timely manner.
Joe Klein stated in his blog, “a quick decision is not a good idea” until the Afghan elections are resolved to allow President Obama time to see “what the next Afghan governmnet [sic] is going to look like” as well as to see if our allies, the Canadians, British, Australians, and Dutch, will remain steadfast. Unfortunately, our allies are waiting for President Obama to make his decision; if he wavers and fails to meet the requirements outlined by Gen. McChrystal, it will indicate to our allies that he is no longer stalwart in his support for the “necessary war” and they will see no need to continue their support for the mission. Furthermore, not only will it signal to our allies, rightly or wrongly, that we are no longer sure of the fight, it will signal the same to our enemies, the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, and to our main ally in the region, Pakistan.
This indecisiveness and, more importantly, the failure to provide the required troops, will embolden our enemies at a crucial time in the war. The enemy could care less who sits in the president’s office in Kabul; they will not put the war on hold until a run-off election is held. Furthermore, unlike the Obama administration’s running of the war, they are quite sure of their objective, destroy everyone not adhering to their violently radical version of Islam, take over Afghanistan, install an extremely violent, perverted version of shari`a, then take the fight to America.
The longer President Obama takes to reinforce Gen. McChrystal, the more indecisive he seems and the quicker the enemy will seize the initiative, thus giving the advantage to the enemy as they will interpret the president's lack of resolve as a reflection of American society writ large, much like the North Vietnamese did after 1968, and use it to drive a wedge between the military and the American people, with the Obama White House in the middle.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
Media bias and national security
As I was preparing my inaugural blog, on Afghanistan and the recent request by Gen. McChrystal for additional troops, I went to my Google page and typed in “Obama AND Afghanistan.” I assumed, with all of the recent media coverage about this topic, there would be numerous links to the current discussion. As expected, the very first link on my results page was about Obama approving an increase in troop levels for Afghanistan; however, it was a CNN article from February 2009. Why would an article from February be the number one result on my results page with all of the new talk about troop increases?
Then it hit me. It is an effort by the pro-Obama media to ensure the American people are aware that Obama has approved troop increases before, thus ensuring the American people are behind Obama when he denies this current request. Obama’s administration can point to the fact that he has approved a troop increase this year and try to make it seem as if the military commanders in Afghanistan and Tampa cannot manage the war.
There has been a lot of discussion about the liberal media and its pro-Obama bias, but this is outrageous. This is tantamount to psychological operations being used against a domestic audience in order to effect a desired outcome.
Since October 2001 our troops and the troops of our allies have operated at a tempo at which the enemy, the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, is unable to operate. Our troops keep them off-balance and unable to think about bringing terror back to the United States. If this leads to increased support for Obama and the military commanders’ warnings are not heeded, it could result in an emboldening of the enemy and cause further casualties among our troops we do have there or possibly allow them to operate at the level they need to in order to carry out another attack in the United States.
Then it hit me. It is an effort by the pro-Obama media to ensure the American people are aware that Obama has approved troop increases before, thus ensuring the American people are behind Obama when he denies this current request. Obama’s administration can point to the fact that he has approved a troop increase this year and try to make it seem as if the military commanders in Afghanistan and Tampa cannot manage the war.
There has been a lot of discussion about the liberal media and its pro-Obama bias, but this is outrageous. This is tantamount to psychological operations being used against a domestic audience in order to effect a desired outcome.
Since October 2001 our troops and the troops of our allies have operated at a tempo at which the enemy, the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, is unable to operate. Our troops keep them off-balance and unable to think about bringing terror back to the United States. If this leads to increased support for Obama and the military commanders’ warnings are not heeded, it could result in an emboldening of the enemy and cause further casualties among our troops we do have there or possibly allow them to operate at the level they need to in order to carry out another attack in the United States.
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