Immediately after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 airport security was drastically increased. Anyone and everyone, regardless of color, creed, age, or sex was subject to additional screening when passing through security checkpoints. Along with the increase in security came the calls for profiling. While people claimed they understood and appreciated the increased security, they did not want it to impact them, only those they believed could possibly be terrorists. In other words, the only people that needed additional scrutiny were young Middle Eastern males; just look at who carried out 9/11 and who blows up buses in Israel. Why should lily-white, red-blooded Joe Blow or his senior citizen grandmother have to take off their shoes and risk possibly missing their flight when there are so many Middle Eastern-looking people (this includes Latinos according to some) that represent a much higher risk?
Dr. Edward N. Luttwak believes we should be doing something very similar. In a recent Wall Street Journal Op-Ed piece, he writes, “screen[ing] passengers as persons instead of their bodies and belongings has an overwhelming advantage,” namely that this method “can detect a would-be terrorist even if the specific technique he tries to employ is not previously known.” While his risk-based approach has some merit, once al-Qa`ida operators understand which groups are not screened and which ones receive extra attention, they will simply devise ways to join those groups.
On September 11, 2001 the 19 hijackers were all of Middle Eastern, mostly Saudi, descent. For some time after 9/11, many terrorist operatives were of similar background. As al-Qa`ida was disrupted and displaced, and more franchise organizations came online, the probability of a terrorist being of Middle Eastern descent began to diminish. Just as the United States and its Western allies adjusted anti-terrorism defenses based on the last attack, al-Qa`ida adjusted its offensive capabilities by varying the color, ethnicity, and even sex of its operatives in order to defeat the anti-terrorism measures.
The phrase, “wilderness of mirrors,” an allusion to Alice in Wonderland, was how some intelligence experts described the spy war between the United States and Soviet Union. It is still used to describe the war between counter-terrorism professionals and terrorists; one side trying to gain the edge against the other in small battles all around the globe while trying to make the other side believe something that is not true. We continuously try to find ways to thwart the next 9/11 and they, the terrorists, are always looking for that small gap in our anti-terrorism protection rings to exploit and kill people. These small battles can have great, strategic impacts on the overall war.
Sun Tzu said, “All war is based on deception.” By keeping the terrorists guessing, they will never truly know what we know or what we don’t know about them and their operations. That may sound like a Rumsfeld axiom, but in warfare it is absolutely true. If we only screened young Middle Eastern males, al-Qa`ida would recruit (and they have been) or attract Westerners such as John Walker “the American Taliban” Lindh, Daniel Patrick Boyd, or Bryant Neal Vinas. This satisfies two requirements for al-Qa`ida planners, it provides an operative less likely to be viewed as a terrorist by the mainstream public and it gives them someone familiar with Western culture and travel. This last requirement goes toward defeating the Transportation Security Administration’s Behavioral Detection Officers (BDO) who are looking for individuals feeling out of place and nervous. The more confidence an operative has, the less likely they will be singled out by BDOs. We must keep them guessing as to the true capabilities of our anti- and counter-terrorism assets and measures.
Some people ask, “Doesn’t the fact that in an open democratic society most of the anti-terrorism measures put into place are eventually exposed by the media or civil liberties groups?” and “Doesn’t that exposure defeat the purpose of keeping those measures secret from al-Qa`ida so they do not know our capabilities?” In some ways the answer is yes, by exposing our capabilities to the enemy it allows them to design ways to defeat them; however, on the other hand, the terrorists do not know how good those capabilities are and whether they work or not. President Reagan used the idea of “Star Wars,” the U.S. military’s space-based warfare concept in the 1980s, to deceive the Soviets into believing this program would work. They then bankrupted their economy trying to develop a program of their own that could defeat ours. But ours only really existed on paper, not in the near future as Soviet intelligence was led to believe. Pardon the clichés, but power perceived is power achieved and the rest, as they say, is history.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Monday, January 18, 2010
Al-Qa`ida’s Christmas Day attack; déjà vu all over again
The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 on Christmas Day was no success for al-Qa`ida, but it was no success for U.S. counterterrorism authorities either. The United States’ Intelligence Community (IC) and counterterrorism agencies had at least two opportunities to deny Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab from succeeding, his U.S. visa could have been revoked or he could have been stopped at the boarding gate by being placed on the Transportation Security Administration’s No-Fly watchlist; instead, it was pure, dumb luck that almost 300 people were not killed on Christmas day. Luckily, Abdulmutallab was an inept operative and the detonator was of such miserable quality that it failed to work properly. The planners and bomb-makers of al-Qa`ida are not idiots. They operate much like military planners do around the world. If an operation is not executed properly they go back to the drawing board, learn from their mistakes, implement the necessary changes, and go at it again. There is no shortage of shuhadaa willing to martyr themselves for the cause and eventually they will catch us off-guard, just like Abdulmutallab did, and then we might not be so lucky.
Why did the Christmas attack fail?
Al-Qa`ida’s traditional method of attack includes complex, simultaneous attacks. They do this for two reasons. One, it ensures one or more attacks succeed. We cannot guard everything, everywhere and, just like drug trafficking organizations, they play the percentage game where for everyone one or two that get caught, three or four succeed. Second, the more attacks that succeed simultaneously, the more we have to stretch our response assets, thus eliminating any redundant response systems we might have in place and straining the entire system. That was not the case in the Christmas attack. Why? More than likely it was because Abdulmutallab’s handlers in Yemen are not as sophisticated as other al-Qa`ida planners such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, or Muhammad Atef. However, the Christmas attempt could also have been simply to test airport security or the effectiveness of the device in defeating airport screening. According to media reports, Abdulmutallab has told investigators there are many others just like him ready to carry out attacks against the United States or its interests. It is possible Abdulmutallab was conducting a reconnaissance of airport security and was prepared to exploit any deficiencies he found, which he almost succeeded in doing. CNN reported on Friday there appears to be a “palpable level of angst” among intelligence officials and that those officials believe “there are a lot of” other potential bombers out there with the training needed to carry out another attack.
Why did we fail?
Today’s al-Qa`ida is not the same al-Qa`ida we faced on September 10, 2001. Today we face a multifarious, geographically diverse enemy, beholden to an ideology and not to a person issuing commands from a cave in the Hindu Kush. As a result, the operators and planners we face are as varied as their locations, presenting a heterogeneous organism that evolves and adapts faster than we can imagine, or at least faster than we can react. It is for that reason that the single most important aspect of national security we have at our disposal is information sharing.
John Brennan, the Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, led a preliminary review of the Christmas Day attack. The findings of that review were published last week and outlined nine shortcomings that, together, nearly led to the single deadliest attack on American soil since 9/11. The premise of these findings is that, while there was enough information within the IC and it was properly shared to identify and watchlist Abdulmutallab so that he could not have boarded a flight to the U.S., the analysts responsible for doing so failed to “connect the dots.” Most importantly though, the only agencies listed in the findings are CIA and NCTC; one whose mission lies outside America’s borders and the other who was created to help the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) coordinate information between agencies, not to act as an operational component of the IC, which is what it has effectively become. Though the report states there was not an information sharing problem, the one department created and charged with homeland security, DHS, is not even mentioned because they were not part of the equation, thus clearly demonstrating a lack of information sharing. How can you have a cabinet-level department whose singular mission is to protect the homeland and not even mention it in the report unless the information was never shared with it to begin with?
This is not the first time the IC’s lack of information sharing has resulted in an attack. We saw Major Nidal Hassan succeed in killing fellow Soldiers at Ft. Hood because information gleaned by FBI and DOD was deemed inconsequent and not shared with the experts on extremism and radicalization at DHS. These agencies, lacking experts in the fields of extremism and radicalization, viewed Hasan’s activities from a law enforcement perspective; “was he committing a crime?”
Similarly, Carlos Leon Bledsoe, the Muslim convert who shot and killed U.S. Soldiers in front of a recruiting office in Little Rock, AR in June last year had been under FBI investigation since he returned from Yemen, allegedly for being in Yemen and his arrest there for possessing a Somali passport. Everyone today understands how critical Yemen is in the fight against al-Qa`ida’s ideology and the fact this individual was there and possessed a Somali passport—Somalia has not had a government since the early 1990s and any Somali passport being used today is going to be outdated and/or fictitious—would raise “red flags” with extremism and radicalization experts who have known about Yemen and Somalia since the 1990s. But again, that information was never shared outside FBI channels, who were simply looking for criminal activity. Unfortunately, they got their criminal activity, at the cost of two Soldiers shot, one of whom died.
How do we fix the system?
Any recommendations on addressing the identified problems need to focus on the failure to share information and any effort to truly secure the homeland must not only include DHS, but must put it first, otherwise, we are no better off than we were on September 10, 2001.
There is no one solution to securing the nation; there are multiple layers of security that must be coordinated effectively and that have to change their posture on an irregular basis so as not to establish a pattern that al-Qa`ida can identify and exploit. There are many so-called experts and a plethora of politicians that think they know better than the real experts; those men and women that are out there everyday implementing the rules and procedures that have thus far, except in a few instances, kept al-Qa`ida from executing another 9/11-style attack. The best thing Congress can do is to allow the departments and agencies implementing our national security the flexibility to do their jobs. One thing we definitely do not need is more oversight.
I am sure there will be no shortage of individuals attacking my assessments and recommendations. I will simply preface my recommendations with this: all plans and solutions look good on paper; it is how they actually work when implemented that matters. The assessments below are based either on personal experience or on interviews conducted with individuals who actually work in these departments and agencies and intimately understand how they work on a day-to-day basis.
First, DHS must be the lead federal agency when it comes to homeland security. While the FBI has the legal authority to investigate all terrorism-related incidents, DHS must have the legal authority to conduct all intelligence-related operations. Only when the intelligence points to an active plan to carry out an attack should the FBI become involved. Currently, if FBI decides someone is a terrorist or has terrorist connections they open an investigation, essentially eschewing intelligence as a tool. Once they open that investigation they severely limit with whom that information can then be shared, which was the key failure behind 9/11 and the primary reason DHS was created. This even includes state and local law enforcement officials who may have critical intelligence related to the individual in question or who would benefit from simply having situational awareness. I am not sure if FBI is still wrapped in the institutional mindset that they are the premier law enforcement agency, like they were before 9/11, or if it is just the idea that they want all the glory, but due to privacy concerns and civil liberty issues, the law enforcement aspect and terrorism intelligence piece of FBI need to be completely separated. DHS should operate the only domestic terrorism intelligence agency.
Of course, the argument will be made that there are DHS and state and local law enforcement liaison officers assigned to NCTC and that this is where the information is shared. Unfortunately, the majority of the information is restricted to only those liaison officers; in most cases they are not allowed to pass the information back to their parent departments or agencies. The liaison officers are just that, liaisons, not necessarily the subject matter experts. The experts reside with the parent departments or agencies and do not receive the information. The creation of NCTC as an analytic, operational component of the IC basically created another stovepipe where information is gathered and never shared, at least not in a timely fashion.
Second, the DNI, through NCTC, needs to assert his power over the IC, demanding that information sharing not only be uppermost in everyone’s mission statement, but also in their daily activities. NCTC needs to stop trying to become an operational component of the IC and focus on coordinating products and missions between other members of the IC. As it stands right now NCTC acts as if it is simply a new component of the IC; the manpower of NCTC is way over its original authorization. Instead of developing their own studies and products, they should concentrate on ensuring the departments and agencies responsible for various topics are tasked with the development of the necessary products or provide the required answers. When there is a challenging problem, they should focus on bringing the subject matter experts from around the IC together to work on them. Unfortunately, many IC agencies are understaffed because they are providing personnel to NCTC and DNI. Once the project has been completed those experts should be released back to their parent organizations. And finally, while they are working at NCTC, these analysts should be authorized to share the information with their home agencies and not be hamstrung behind soundproof walls. As Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France’s leading magistrate investigating terrorism from 1981 to 2007 wrote in a New York Times Op-Ed last week, “Often, it is the small, apparently trivial sign lost in the avalanche of data that forewarns of a coming threat. The more trained eyes there are on information, the more likely that sign is to be read.”
There is an old saying that “knowledge is power.” And information is knowledge. Inside the Washington, DC beltway information is the “holy grail.” The person with the most wins. While the leaders of our intelligence and counterterrorism departments and agencies are professionals, they are also political appointees and are always looking for the edge. The further we get from 9/11, the more these departments and agencies will begin to revert to their old ways. If more emphasis is not placed on removing the barriers to sharing information and certain departments and agencies are allowed to re-build their pre-9/11 fiefdoms, the more vulnerabilities will be created that will allow those multifaceted, al-Qa`ida associates of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to exploit our individualistic system and execute an operation. And unless we learn from this most recent intelligence failure, al-Qa`ida will eventually succeed.
Why did the Christmas attack fail?
Al-Qa`ida’s traditional method of attack includes complex, simultaneous attacks. They do this for two reasons. One, it ensures one or more attacks succeed. We cannot guard everything, everywhere and, just like drug trafficking organizations, they play the percentage game where for everyone one or two that get caught, three or four succeed. Second, the more attacks that succeed simultaneously, the more we have to stretch our response assets, thus eliminating any redundant response systems we might have in place and straining the entire system. That was not the case in the Christmas attack. Why? More than likely it was because Abdulmutallab’s handlers in Yemen are not as sophisticated as other al-Qa`ida planners such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, or Muhammad Atef. However, the Christmas attempt could also have been simply to test airport security or the effectiveness of the device in defeating airport screening. According to media reports, Abdulmutallab has told investigators there are many others just like him ready to carry out attacks against the United States or its interests. It is possible Abdulmutallab was conducting a reconnaissance of airport security and was prepared to exploit any deficiencies he found, which he almost succeeded in doing. CNN reported on Friday there appears to be a “palpable level of angst” among intelligence officials and that those officials believe “there are a lot of” other potential bombers out there with the training needed to carry out another attack.
Why did we fail?
Today’s al-Qa`ida is not the same al-Qa`ida we faced on September 10, 2001. Today we face a multifarious, geographically diverse enemy, beholden to an ideology and not to a person issuing commands from a cave in the Hindu Kush. As a result, the operators and planners we face are as varied as their locations, presenting a heterogeneous organism that evolves and adapts faster than we can imagine, or at least faster than we can react. It is for that reason that the single most important aspect of national security we have at our disposal is information sharing.
John Brennan, the Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, led a preliminary review of the Christmas Day attack. The findings of that review were published last week and outlined nine shortcomings that, together, nearly led to the single deadliest attack on American soil since 9/11. The premise of these findings is that, while there was enough information within the IC and it was properly shared to identify and watchlist Abdulmutallab so that he could not have boarded a flight to the U.S., the analysts responsible for doing so failed to “connect the dots.” Most importantly though, the only agencies listed in the findings are CIA and NCTC; one whose mission lies outside America’s borders and the other who was created to help the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) coordinate information between agencies, not to act as an operational component of the IC, which is what it has effectively become. Though the report states there was not an information sharing problem, the one department created and charged with homeland security, DHS, is not even mentioned because they were not part of the equation, thus clearly demonstrating a lack of information sharing. How can you have a cabinet-level department whose singular mission is to protect the homeland and not even mention it in the report unless the information was never shared with it to begin with?
This is not the first time the IC’s lack of information sharing has resulted in an attack. We saw Major Nidal Hassan succeed in killing fellow Soldiers at Ft. Hood because information gleaned by FBI and DOD was deemed inconsequent and not shared with the experts on extremism and radicalization at DHS. These agencies, lacking experts in the fields of extremism and radicalization, viewed Hasan’s activities from a law enforcement perspective; “was he committing a crime?”
Similarly, Carlos Leon Bledsoe, the Muslim convert who shot and killed U.S. Soldiers in front of a recruiting office in Little Rock, AR in June last year had been under FBI investigation since he returned from Yemen, allegedly for being in Yemen and his arrest there for possessing a Somali passport. Everyone today understands how critical Yemen is in the fight against al-Qa`ida’s ideology and the fact this individual was there and possessed a Somali passport—Somalia has not had a government since the early 1990s and any Somali passport being used today is going to be outdated and/or fictitious—would raise “red flags” with extremism and radicalization experts who have known about Yemen and Somalia since the 1990s. But again, that information was never shared outside FBI channels, who were simply looking for criminal activity. Unfortunately, they got their criminal activity, at the cost of two Soldiers shot, one of whom died.
How do we fix the system?
Any recommendations on addressing the identified problems need to focus on the failure to share information and any effort to truly secure the homeland must not only include DHS, but must put it first, otherwise, we are no better off than we were on September 10, 2001.
There is no one solution to securing the nation; there are multiple layers of security that must be coordinated effectively and that have to change their posture on an irregular basis so as not to establish a pattern that al-Qa`ida can identify and exploit. There are many so-called experts and a plethora of politicians that think they know better than the real experts; those men and women that are out there everyday implementing the rules and procedures that have thus far, except in a few instances, kept al-Qa`ida from executing another 9/11-style attack. The best thing Congress can do is to allow the departments and agencies implementing our national security the flexibility to do their jobs. One thing we definitely do not need is more oversight.
I am sure there will be no shortage of individuals attacking my assessments and recommendations. I will simply preface my recommendations with this: all plans and solutions look good on paper; it is how they actually work when implemented that matters. The assessments below are based either on personal experience or on interviews conducted with individuals who actually work in these departments and agencies and intimately understand how they work on a day-to-day basis.
First, DHS must be the lead federal agency when it comes to homeland security. While the FBI has the legal authority to investigate all terrorism-related incidents, DHS must have the legal authority to conduct all intelligence-related operations. Only when the intelligence points to an active plan to carry out an attack should the FBI become involved. Currently, if FBI decides someone is a terrorist or has terrorist connections they open an investigation, essentially eschewing intelligence as a tool. Once they open that investigation they severely limit with whom that information can then be shared, which was the key failure behind 9/11 and the primary reason DHS was created. This even includes state and local law enforcement officials who may have critical intelligence related to the individual in question or who would benefit from simply having situational awareness. I am not sure if FBI is still wrapped in the institutional mindset that they are the premier law enforcement agency, like they were before 9/11, or if it is just the idea that they want all the glory, but due to privacy concerns and civil liberty issues, the law enforcement aspect and terrorism intelligence piece of FBI need to be completely separated. DHS should operate the only domestic terrorism intelligence agency.
Of course, the argument will be made that there are DHS and state and local law enforcement liaison officers assigned to NCTC and that this is where the information is shared. Unfortunately, the majority of the information is restricted to only those liaison officers; in most cases they are not allowed to pass the information back to their parent departments or agencies. The liaison officers are just that, liaisons, not necessarily the subject matter experts. The experts reside with the parent departments or agencies and do not receive the information. The creation of NCTC as an analytic, operational component of the IC basically created another stovepipe where information is gathered and never shared, at least not in a timely fashion.
Second, the DNI, through NCTC, needs to assert his power over the IC, demanding that information sharing not only be uppermost in everyone’s mission statement, but also in their daily activities. NCTC needs to stop trying to become an operational component of the IC and focus on coordinating products and missions between other members of the IC. As it stands right now NCTC acts as if it is simply a new component of the IC; the manpower of NCTC is way over its original authorization. Instead of developing their own studies and products, they should concentrate on ensuring the departments and agencies responsible for various topics are tasked with the development of the necessary products or provide the required answers. When there is a challenging problem, they should focus on bringing the subject matter experts from around the IC together to work on them. Unfortunately, many IC agencies are understaffed because they are providing personnel to NCTC and DNI. Once the project has been completed those experts should be released back to their parent organizations. And finally, while they are working at NCTC, these analysts should be authorized to share the information with their home agencies and not be hamstrung behind soundproof walls. As Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France’s leading magistrate investigating terrorism from 1981 to 2007 wrote in a New York Times Op-Ed last week, “Often, it is the small, apparently trivial sign lost in the avalanche of data that forewarns of a coming threat. The more trained eyes there are on information, the more likely that sign is to be read.”
There is an old saying that “knowledge is power.” And information is knowledge. Inside the Washington, DC beltway information is the “holy grail.” The person with the most wins. While the leaders of our intelligence and counterterrorism departments and agencies are professionals, they are also political appointees and are always looking for the edge. The further we get from 9/11, the more these departments and agencies will begin to revert to their old ways. If more emphasis is not placed on removing the barriers to sharing information and certain departments and agencies are allowed to re-build their pre-9/11 fiefdoms, the more vulnerabilities will be created that will allow those multifaceted, al-Qa`ida associates of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to exploit our individualistic system and execute an operation. And unless we learn from this most recent intelligence failure, al-Qa`ida will eventually succeed.
Thursday, January 7, 2010
Why the security system failed to detect the underwear bomber and why it will continue to fail
There has been much finger pointing since Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed bombing of the Christmas Day Northwest flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. Originally the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) declared that the system worked, and then the President countered her and stated the system, specifically the Intelligence Community, failed as a whole. As a terrorism and homeland security expert, I must agree with the President. And, regardless what his counterterrorism advisor John Brennan has claimed, the one, incontrovertible reason our system failed was due to the lack of information sharing. But even more importantly, this was not the first time the system failed due to a lack of information sharing since 9/11.
According to media reports, the United Kingdom’s intelligence services were already aware of Abdulmutallab’s potential for violence as was his own father who reportedly informed our own State Department. Unfortunately, the State Department failed to do two very important things: first, they failed to check their own records and realize Abdulmutallab was in possession of a U.S. visa. That would have ended his ability to travel to the U.S. and none of the rest would matter. However, their second mistake was failing to pass that information to the rest of the IC, most importantly, to DHS, which would have guaranteed that even if Abdulmutallab was able to enter one of our neighboring countries, he would have been prevented from crossing a land border into the U.S.
The lack of information sharing persists even with the lessons learned from 9/11 and the offices put into place since to facilitate better information sharing. For example, according to the media the FBI and DOD were in possession of information that indicated U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan was in contact with the same Yemeni-based radical sheikh, Anwar al-Aulaqi, that Abdulmutallab was emailing before his attack. Like the situation with Abdulmutallab, the information on Hasan was not shared with the rest of the IC.
In response to the failed Christmas attack, President Obama has ordered a surge in the number of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs). But how would this prevent future Abdulmutallabs from carrying out another attack? The passengers were able to subdue Abdulmutallab, once he tried to ignite his detonator. If his detonator worked properly, and even if FAMs were aboard, they would simply be among the casualties being picked up off the ground. While adding FAMs is a good step forward in our response strategy, the public should not be fooled into believing FAMs are the answer to secure flights. Our prevention strategy must be just that, to prevent something like this from happening to begin with.
Our security strategy is based on a concentric circle, or layered, approach, which is the right way to do it; if one layer fails the subsequent layers should work. However, the one, single point of failure, is information sharing. This links all the other layers in the security strategy so that departments and agencies working in one layer know what is happening in all the other layers. In both cases mentioned above information sharing was non-existent, thus allowing the entire system to fail and permitting one of the two attacks to succeed. That is a 50% success rate for the terrorists. Unless serious doctrinal changes are made at the departments and agencies most responsible for failing to share information, this will continue and sooner or later, regardless of how many FAMs are aboard or how much you make passengers strip before boarding a flight, one of these violent extremists will achieve martyrdom, at the expense of a few hundred, or even thousand, American citizens.
According to media reports, the United Kingdom’s intelligence services were already aware of Abdulmutallab’s potential for violence as was his own father who reportedly informed our own State Department. Unfortunately, the State Department failed to do two very important things: first, they failed to check their own records and realize Abdulmutallab was in possession of a U.S. visa. That would have ended his ability to travel to the U.S. and none of the rest would matter. However, their second mistake was failing to pass that information to the rest of the IC, most importantly, to DHS, which would have guaranteed that even if Abdulmutallab was able to enter one of our neighboring countries, he would have been prevented from crossing a land border into the U.S.
The lack of information sharing persists even with the lessons learned from 9/11 and the offices put into place since to facilitate better information sharing. For example, according to the media the FBI and DOD were in possession of information that indicated U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan was in contact with the same Yemeni-based radical sheikh, Anwar al-Aulaqi, that Abdulmutallab was emailing before his attack. Like the situation with Abdulmutallab, the information on Hasan was not shared with the rest of the IC.
In response to the failed Christmas attack, President Obama has ordered a surge in the number of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs). But how would this prevent future Abdulmutallabs from carrying out another attack? The passengers were able to subdue Abdulmutallab, once he tried to ignite his detonator. If his detonator worked properly, and even if FAMs were aboard, they would simply be among the casualties being picked up off the ground. While adding FAMs is a good step forward in our response strategy, the public should not be fooled into believing FAMs are the answer to secure flights. Our prevention strategy must be just that, to prevent something like this from happening to begin with.
Our security strategy is based on a concentric circle, or layered, approach, which is the right way to do it; if one layer fails the subsequent layers should work. However, the one, single point of failure, is information sharing. This links all the other layers in the security strategy so that departments and agencies working in one layer know what is happening in all the other layers. In both cases mentioned above information sharing was non-existent, thus allowing the entire system to fail and permitting one of the two attacks to succeed. That is a 50% success rate for the terrorists. Unless serious doctrinal changes are made at the departments and agencies most responsible for failing to share information, this will continue and sooner or later, regardless of how many FAMs are aboard or how much you make passengers strip before boarding a flight, one of these violent extremists will achieve martyrdom, at the expense of a few hundred, or even thousand, American citizens.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Introduction of 9/11 terrorists in U.S. prisons runs the risk of creating more terrorists
The introduction of some of the most prominent al-Qa`ida terrorists, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, into the U.S. prison system will risk radicalizing other inmates as well as providing a cause célèbre that other violent Islamists can rally behind. Like almost all things in the domestic counter-terrorism arena, one need only look to the Europeans, in this case the British, who always seem to face these problems before we do. The U.K.-based counter-terrorism think-tank, the Quilliam Foundation, just released a report demonstrating how Britain's most dangerous al-Qa`ida leaders continue to proselytize, recruit, and produce propaganda, all from inside some of Britain's highest security prisons, thus presenting a security risk to not only the prison population and corrections officers, but also to the British population writ large when the radicalized individuals are eventually released.
Radicalization in prison is a sub-set of the overall radicalization phenomenon; however, due to the audience, people generally predisposed to violence and anti-government sentiments, and the setting, a confined space without much in the way of distractions, the radicalization of Muslim converts in U.S. prisons represents a greater threat than radicalization in the larger population outside of prison.
Some of the most dedicated radical Islamists in the U.S. have been converts. These individuals feel that by dedicating their lives to violence on behalf of groups such as al-Qa`ida they will become true believers or prove their devotion. Unfortunately, many converts do so while in prison, thus coupling the idea of becoming a radical Islamist with someone that is already prone to violence and possibly already infused with anti-government or anti-establishment ideals. This creates the perfect embodiment of the violent Islamist, or terrorist, that Osama bin Laden would like to see operating within the United States.
According to the Quilliam report, Abu Qatada, once described by a Spanish judge as "bin Laden’s right-hand man in Europe," published fatwas — religious rulings — on the internet while sequestered in one of the UK's "supermax" prisons. The report detailed how "last year, under the noses of [prison officials], Qatada and Adel Abdel Bary, leader of the UK branch of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, were able to smuggle out a series of fatwas legitimising attacks by Al Qaeda and endorsing the murder of moderate Muslims."
Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," was born in Britain to a Jamaican father and white mother. After dropping out of school and pursuing a life of crime, Reid was imprisoned. There he followed his father's example and converted to Islam, ultimately adhering to a more radical version of the religion and attending the notorious Finsbury Park mosque, the north-central London mosque infamous for its salafist imams preaching jihad as well as for its coterie of al-Qa`ida attendees. Reid eventually attempted to ignite explosives concealed in his shoes while aboard a trans-Atlantic flight from the UK to the U.S.
This phenomenon is not restricted to Europe. In 2005 Kevin James (aka Shaykh Shabaab Murshid), an African-American Muslim convert who, while incarcerated in California in 1997 founded the radical Jam`iyyat ul-Islam is-Saheeh (JIS), was indicted along with three co-conspirators with plotting to attack synagogues and U.S. military installations. According to media sources, James recruited one of his co-conspirators in prison who was then released and subsequently recruited another co-conspirator. Based on evidence obtained after the arrest of James and his co-conspirators, the plot was in the advanced stages.
In May of this year New Yorker James Cromitie and three others allegedly conspired to attack New York-area synagogues and shoot down U.S. military aircraft. All reportedly converted to radical Islam during one of their many stints in prison.
More recently, in late October the FBI and Detroit Police Department served arrest warrants for eleven members of the radical Islamist group, the Ummah, led by now-deceased Luqman Abdullah (aka Christopher Thomas). Abdullah led the Ummah on-behalf of Jamil al-Amin (aka H. Rapp Brown), who is currently serving a life sentence for murdering a police officer in Fulton County, Georgia in 2000. Al-Amin, formerly a Black Panther, espoused anti-government and anti-law enforcement rhetoric. He wanted to create a separate state for his followers run under shari`a (fundamentalist Islamic law that can be taken too far such as in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan). For almost a decade, Abdullah, a Muslim convert who converted while in prison, continued al-Amin's work, preaching violent rhetoric to his followers, the majority of whom also converted to Islam while serving time in prison. Abdullah was killed during the arrest attempt in October when he fired on law enforcement officers, killing a police K-9 in the process.
By no means will all prisoners convert to Islam, nor are all prisoners who convert to Islam likely to carry out terrorist attacks once they are released back into society. However, it only required 19 terrorists to execute the 9/11 attacks, only four to carry out the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London transportation system. President Obama and Attorney General Holder need to carefully weigh the risks associated with allowing these al-Qa`ida icons into our civilian prisons where violent men are just awaiting spiritual guidance in the form of violent extremism.
Radicalization in prison is a sub-set of the overall radicalization phenomenon; however, due to the audience, people generally predisposed to violence and anti-government sentiments, and the setting, a confined space without much in the way of distractions, the radicalization of Muslim converts in U.S. prisons represents a greater threat than radicalization in the larger population outside of prison.
Some of the most dedicated radical Islamists in the U.S. have been converts. These individuals feel that by dedicating their lives to violence on behalf of groups such as al-Qa`ida they will become true believers or prove their devotion. Unfortunately, many converts do so while in prison, thus coupling the idea of becoming a radical Islamist with someone that is already prone to violence and possibly already infused with anti-government or anti-establishment ideals. This creates the perfect embodiment of the violent Islamist, or terrorist, that Osama bin Laden would like to see operating within the United States.
According to the Quilliam report, Abu Qatada, once described by a Spanish judge as "bin Laden’s right-hand man in Europe," published fatwas — religious rulings — on the internet while sequestered in one of the UK's "supermax" prisons. The report detailed how "last year, under the noses of [prison officials], Qatada and Adel Abdel Bary, leader of the UK branch of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, were able to smuggle out a series of fatwas legitimising attacks by Al Qaeda and endorsing the murder of moderate Muslims."
Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," was born in Britain to a Jamaican father and white mother. After dropping out of school and pursuing a life of crime, Reid was imprisoned. There he followed his father's example and converted to Islam, ultimately adhering to a more radical version of the religion and attending the notorious Finsbury Park mosque, the north-central London mosque infamous for its salafist imams preaching jihad as well as for its coterie of al-Qa`ida attendees. Reid eventually attempted to ignite explosives concealed in his shoes while aboard a trans-Atlantic flight from the UK to the U.S.
This phenomenon is not restricted to Europe. In 2005 Kevin James (aka Shaykh Shabaab Murshid), an African-American Muslim convert who, while incarcerated in California in 1997 founded the radical Jam`iyyat ul-Islam is-Saheeh (JIS), was indicted along with three co-conspirators with plotting to attack synagogues and U.S. military installations. According to media sources, James recruited one of his co-conspirators in prison who was then released and subsequently recruited another co-conspirator. Based on evidence obtained after the arrest of James and his co-conspirators, the plot was in the advanced stages.
In May of this year New Yorker James Cromitie and three others allegedly conspired to attack New York-area synagogues and shoot down U.S. military aircraft. All reportedly converted to radical Islam during one of their many stints in prison.
More recently, in late October the FBI and Detroit Police Department served arrest warrants for eleven members of the radical Islamist group, the Ummah, led by now-deceased Luqman Abdullah (aka Christopher Thomas). Abdullah led the Ummah on-behalf of Jamil al-Amin (aka H. Rapp Brown), who is currently serving a life sentence for murdering a police officer in Fulton County, Georgia in 2000. Al-Amin, formerly a Black Panther, espoused anti-government and anti-law enforcement rhetoric. He wanted to create a separate state for his followers run under shari`a (fundamentalist Islamic law that can be taken too far such as in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan). For almost a decade, Abdullah, a Muslim convert who converted while in prison, continued al-Amin's work, preaching violent rhetoric to his followers, the majority of whom also converted to Islam while serving time in prison. Abdullah was killed during the arrest attempt in October when he fired on law enforcement officers, killing a police K-9 in the process.
By no means will all prisoners convert to Islam, nor are all prisoners who convert to Islam likely to carry out terrorist attacks once they are released back into society. However, it only required 19 terrorists to execute the 9/11 attacks, only four to carry out the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London transportation system. President Obama and Attorney General Holder need to carefully weigh the risks associated with allowing these al-Qa`ida icons into our civilian prisons where violent men are just awaiting spiritual guidance in the form of violent extremism.
Friday, November 13, 2009
Civilian trials for 9/11 terror suspects
Today it was announced by Attorney General Eric Holder that five terror suspects, currently being held by the military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, will be transferred to U.S. civilian judicial authority in New York in preparation for a civilian trial. While there have been no shortage of "experts" explaining how this is a good thing for the rule of law, and I am sure they are well intentioned, they fail to explain how a terrorist, captured by the military on a field of battle, can be tried in a civilian court. These are not traditional criminals or criminal cases.
Most legal talking-heads that support this decision cite the success of previous terror cases tried in civilian courts; cases such as Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (aka the Blind Sheikh), Ramzi Youssef, and Zacarias Moussaoui, all terrorists and all tried and convicted in federal court. AG Holder touts the expertise of federal prosecutors in these cases, and rightly so. However, those cases, and many other terrorist cases, all had one thing in common, they were pursued in a traditional legal manner by law enforcement officers trained in the standards and expectations of civilian courts and that took great care not to do anything that could render the cases un-winnable in those courts.
There are any number of loopholes these terrorists can pursue in the civilian legal system in order to thwart our efforts in the pursuit of justice. In a standard criminal complaint law enforcement officers are immediately involved, pursuing the suspects and meticulously gathering and documenting evidence. Once they capture the suspect certain rules must be followed, such as reading of Miranda rights, due process, right to speedy trials, right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and so forth, most of which the U.S. military is not trained to do; they are trained to find, close with, and kill the enemy. In cases where enemy soldiers are captured, they are tried before Military Tribunals, which have their own legal standards and expectations and have been used throughout our nation's history; they were not simply created by former-President Bush.
Some areas of concern from a legal standpoint include protection against illegal searches and seizures (Fourth Amendment), the right to due process and protection against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment), and protection against cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth Amendment). Will the fact that some of the defendants (i.e. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) were "tortured" be used in their defense? If they incriminated themselves during that torture, will that be thrown out? Can they argue that they were not afforded speedy trials because they were held for years at "black sites" or Guantanamo Bay? Additionally, what about the use of classified information or intelligence in the capture or prosecution of these individuals? Will it be allowed in court? What will be the standard as far as how it was obtained or used? Also, what about the assistance of foreign allies, particularly countries with questionable legal practices, such as Pakistan and the Afghan militias that helped overthrow and capture key Taliban and al-Qa`ida operatives?
I am sure AG Holder, his legal advisers, and those of the Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, and other agencies have all reviewed these points and took them into consideration before making the decision to try these terrorists in civilian courts. But that is no guarantee that a judge or jury will reach the same conclusions as did they; just look at O.J. Simpson. Not to mention, by putting them in the civilian legal system they are free to pursue appeal after appeal, essentially taking advantage of the very legal system they have sought to bring down since 1993. It also sets a precedent for future terrorists to seek trials through civilian courts. Likewise, any decisions made in the rulings of these first five with respect to what is or is not allowed will establish how all future cases are pursued.
I completely disagree with President Obama's decision to bring these terrorists to the U.S. for trial. I think it opens us up for scrutiny of the practices used to capture and hold terrorists, not to mention allowing that information out into the public domain where future terrorists can learn lessons, and will delay justice for the survivors of 9/11. Of course, there are those that will argue that bringing these individuals back to the scene of their crimes will provide closure for the survivors, but I contend the survivors will not have closure until these animals are 6-feet under, and I do not think they care how they get there or who puts them there.
Most legal talking-heads that support this decision cite the success of previous terror cases tried in civilian courts; cases such as Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (aka the Blind Sheikh), Ramzi Youssef, and Zacarias Moussaoui, all terrorists and all tried and convicted in federal court. AG Holder touts the expertise of federal prosecutors in these cases, and rightly so. However, those cases, and many other terrorist cases, all had one thing in common, they were pursued in a traditional legal manner by law enforcement officers trained in the standards and expectations of civilian courts and that took great care not to do anything that could render the cases un-winnable in those courts.
There are any number of loopholes these terrorists can pursue in the civilian legal system in order to thwart our efforts in the pursuit of justice. In a standard criminal complaint law enforcement officers are immediately involved, pursuing the suspects and meticulously gathering and documenting evidence. Once they capture the suspect certain rules must be followed, such as reading of Miranda rights, due process, right to speedy trials, right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and so forth, most of which the U.S. military is not trained to do; they are trained to find, close with, and kill the enemy. In cases where enemy soldiers are captured, they are tried before Military Tribunals, which have their own legal standards and expectations and have been used throughout our nation's history; they were not simply created by former-President Bush.
Some areas of concern from a legal standpoint include protection against illegal searches and seizures (Fourth Amendment), the right to due process and protection against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment), and protection against cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth Amendment). Will the fact that some of the defendants (i.e. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) were "tortured" be used in their defense? If they incriminated themselves during that torture, will that be thrown out? Can they argue that they were not afforded speedy trials because they were held for years at "black sites" or Guantanamo Bay? Additionally, what about the use of classified information or intelligence in the capture or prosecution of these individuals? Will it be allowed in court? What will be the standard as far as how it was obtained or used? Also, what about the assistance of foreign allies, particularly countries with questionable legal practices, such as Pakistan and the Afghan militias that helped overthrow and capture key Taliban and al-Qa`ida operatives?
I am sure AG Holder, his legal advisers, and those of the Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, and other agencies have all reviewed these points and took them into consideration before making the decision to try these terrorists in civilian courts. But that is no guarantee that a judge or jury will reach the same conclusions as did they; just look at O.J. Simpson. Not to mention, by putting them in the civilian legal system they are free to pursue appeal after appeal, essentially taking advantage of the very legal system they have sought to bring down since 1993. It also sets a precedent for future terrorists to seek trials through civilian courts. Likewise, any decisions made in the rulings of these first five with respect to what is or is not allowed will establish how all future cases are pursued.
I completely disagree with President Obama's decision to bring these terrorists to the U.S. for trial. I think it opens us up for scrutiny of the practices used to capture and hold terrorists, not to mention allowing that information out into the public domain where future terrorists can learn lessons, and will delay justice for the survivors of 9/11. Of course, there are those that will argue that bringing these individuals back to the scene of their crimes will provide closure for the survivors, but I contend the survivors will not have closure until these animals are 6-feet under, and I do not think they care how they get there or who puts them there.
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Was the Ft. Hood Shooting a Case of Homegrown Terrorism?
There are many people that are speculating about the reasons behind the shooting and killing of almost 55 people at Ft. Hood, Texas late last week. The alleged shooter, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, is an American Muslim convert who supposedly hated the idea of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. He also allegedly yelled “Allah-u Akbar,” or “God is Great” in Arabic, before he began shooting Soldiers and civilians gathered at Ft. Hood’s Soldier Readiness Center preparing to deploy overseas later this year.
But what happened that changed the beliefs of a U.S. Army officer, a doctor no-less, that made him decide to attack his fellow military and civilian colleagues, taking the lives of 13? Some accounts, mostly from friends or family members, indicate Hasan joined the military because he wanted to help America after the attacks by violent extremist Islamists on September 11, 2001. However, that does not reflect his alleged actions on November 5, 2009; the worst terrorist attack against Americans since 9/11. If Hasan did in fact hold moderate beliefs when he joined the Army in 2001, he certainly lost them by last week.
Britain’s Daily Telegraph ran an article about Hasan’s ties to the al-Qa`ida mouthpiece Anwar al-Aulaqi who is mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report as a "significant San Diego contact" for two of the 9/11 hijackers. Aulaqi eventually move to the DC-area and served as an imam in the controversial Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Great Falls, Virginia. Some of you may remember that this is also the same mosque the 9/11 hijackers from San Diego began attending after their move to Alexandria, Virginia. Likewise, according to the Daily Telegraph, Hasan supposedly attended this mosque around the same time as two of the hijackers and while Aulaqi was the imam, preaching his venomous sermons.
Aulaqi, who moved to Yemen to escape increasing attention from the FBI, continues to run his extremist website where he posts radical sermons inciting violence against the United States and our allies. Other homegrown terrorists, such as the Ft. Dix Five, have been shown to download and share Aulaqi's anti-American sermons as inspiration to further self-radicalize.
Lone gunmen are nothing new to American society. We have had Columbine, the Amish school shooting, Virginia Tech, the DC sniper, and the shooting in Orlando, Florida last week. While no less horrendous, they were all cases of selfish people who just lost their minds, for lack of a better description, and not cases of individuals, independent in action, but unified in belief and bent on subverting America to their bastardized version of Islam.
It may seem that Hasan snapped because he was due to deploy to Afghanistan in the near future; however, it may also have been the culmination of self-radicalization to the point of violent extremism. If it is proven that he in fact had ties, physical or virtual, to Aulaqi and if he continued to self-radicalize using Aulaqi's violent extremist views, this will be the worst terrorist attack on Americans since 9/11 and really the first case of a successful homegrown Islamist terrorist attack in American history.
But what happened that changed the beliefs of a U.S. Army officer, a doctor no-less, that made him decide to attack his fellow military and civilian colleagues, taking the lives of 13? Some accounts, mostly from friends or family members, indicate Hasan joined the military because he wanted to help America after the attacks by violent extremist Islamists on September 11, 2001. However, that does not reflect his alleged actions on November 5, 2009; the worst terrorist attack against Americans since 9/11. If Hasan did in fact hold moderate beliefs when he joined the Army in 2001, he certainly lost them by last week.
Britain’s Daily Telegraph ran an article about Hasan’s ties to the al-Qa`ida mouthpiece Anwar al-Aulaqi who is mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report as a "significant San Diego contact" for two of the 9/11 hijackers. Aulaqi eventually move to the DC-area and served as an imam in the controversial Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Great Falls, Virginia. Some of you may remember that this is also the same mosque the 9/11 hijackers from San Diego began attending after their move to Alexandria, Virginia. Likewise, according to the Daily Telegraph, Hasan supposedly attended this mosque around the same time as two of the hijackers and while Aulaqi was the imam, preaching his venomous sermons.
Aulaqi, who moved to Yemen to escape increasing attention from the FBI, continues to run his extremist website where he posts radical sermons inciting violence against the United States and our allies. Other homegrown terrorists, such as the Ft. Dix Five, have been shown to download and share Aulaqi's anti-American sermons as inspiration to further self-radicalize.
Lone gunmen are nothing new to American society. We have had Columbine, the Amish school shooting, Virginia Tech, the DC sniper, and the shooting in Orlando, Florida last week. While no less horrendous, they were all cases of selfish people who just lost their minds, for lack of a better description, and not cases of individuals, independent in action, but unified in belief and bent on subverting America to their bastardized version of Islam.
It may seem that Hasan snapped because he was due to deploy to Afghanistan in the near future; however, it may also have been the culmination of self-radicalization to the point of violent extremism. If it is proven that he in fact had ties, physical or virtual, to Aulaqi and if he continued to self-radicalize using Aulaqi's violent extremist views, this will be the worst terrorist attack on Americans since 9/11 and really the first case of a successful homegrown Islamist terrorist attack in American history.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Al-Qa`ida and the world-wide radical Islamic movement: We may be too late
We have missed the opportunity to contain al-Qa`ida’s radical message within Afghanistan / Pakistan. Failing to quickly eliminate the key players, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and accepting Pakistan’s unsuccessful actions against the Taliban, has allowed them and al-Qa`ida to become icons for jihad and to promulgate their propaganda through their media centers, thus allowing their message of hate and intolerance to become the mantra of other radicals around the world. This never-ending propaganda, coupled with the lack of effective Information Operations from our side, provides the motivation that is so indispensable for al-Qa`ida to transform radicals in Western countries into violent extremists.
Recent events demonstrate how local or regional groups, inspired by al-Qa`ida’s brand of radical Islam, present a serious threat to our security. Just within the past ninety-days the FBI has arrested or indictments have been revealed for:
- Hosam Maher Husein Smadi in Dallas, TX
- Michael Finton (aka Talib Islam) in Springfield, IL
- Najibullah Zazi in Colorado Springs, CO; two others were also arrested in
connection to Zazi for non-terrorism-related crimes
- Betim Kaziu in New York
- Daniel Patrick Boyd (and seven cohorts) in North Carolina
Experts do not believe there are connections between any of the cases. I happen to agree; however, that makes it all the more worrisome. If the cases were connected, taking down one would lead to the next and the next, making it easier for law enforcement to “connect-the-dots.” This is not the case. In each case law enforcement was lucky enough to stumble upon the primary individual(s) and insert themselves into their decision-making process or to obtain enough surveillance information (i.e. photos, wiretaps, informants, etc) to take them down.
But what about the next guy or group of guys? The old axiom, “three people can keep a secret if two are dead,” rings especially true. When a number of inexperienced, undisciplined people are involved in a plot sooner or later someone is going to give something up, allowing law enforcement the opportunity to infiltrate the group and put an end to their plans. However, the fewer the people, and especially the fewer the connections to other radicals, particularly those overseas that may be under electronic monitoring, the less chance we will have to stop them. Similarly, homegrown extremists have the luxury of already operating inside of our overseas and border security layers and being familiar with our culture, thus reducing the planning timeframe and the likelihood they will be caught before executing an attack. Eventually, one of them will get lucky.
So, what do all these cases mean for our national security? Well, for one, it means that al-Qa`ida the group is no longer our only terrorist threat. It proves Osama bin Laden does not need to dispatch a group of violent extremists to the United States to carry out an attack; the ideology is enough to motivate lone-wolves or groups of like-minded radicals to attempt to plan and execute an attack on their own. With the threat emanating from overseas our intelligence community is in a position to intercept phone calls or emails related to planning or a future attack, thus providing critical details on those involved. On the other hand, threats emanating from within our borders are much more difficult to track or interdict due to stringent domestic intelligence laws such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The bad guys are not ignorant of this.
Continuing the mission in Afghanistan, while critical to keeping al-Qa`ida’s core leadership off-balance, does not diminish the threat we face from radical Islamists in the Homeland. While we have no legitimate or factual numbers that we can point to, and therefore cannot correlate our presence in Afghanistan or Iraq with the increase in homegrown threats, on the surface it looks as if the two probably are related. We must face the fact that the threat in Homeland from radical Islamists, both with and without overseas training or connections that could potentially tip-off law enforcement or intelligence officials, is increasing.
As the threat from within increases, the belief by the American people that the Homeland is at risk of a terrorist attack is at its lowest level since before 9/11. According to a Rasmussen poll, 49% of Americans believe a terrorist attack is somewhat likely, down 18% from last year and 21% from two years ago. It can be argued that, just as former-President Bush failed to pursue al-Qa`ida by diverting attention and resources to Iraq, so President Obama and his administration are diverting critical attention and resources to the liberal domestic agenda (i.e. healthcare reform, wealth re-distribution, etc). This creates an apathetic, or at least an improperly informed, environment in which these radicals can operate.
The luck our law enforcement has had recently should be a wake-up call for the Obama administration and the American people. If we are lucky, we get a few warnings before something big happens. We have received more than enough warnings, as evident by the list above; we need to address the problem of homegrown radicals now before one of them succeeds in carrying out a terrorist attack in the Homeland.
Recent events demonstrate how local or regional groups, inspired by al-Qa`ida’s brand of radical Islam, present a serious threat to our security. Just within the past ninety-days the FBI has arrested or indictments have been revealed for:
- Hosam Maher Husein Smadi in Dallas, TX
- Michael Finton (aka Talib Islam) in Springfield, IL
- Najibullah Zazi in Colorado Springs, CO; two others were also arrested in
connection to Zazi for non-terrorism-related crimes
- Betim Kaziu in New York
- Daniel Patrick Boyd (and seven cohorts) in North Carolina
Experts do not believe there are connections between any of the cases. I happen to agree; however, that makes it all the more worrisome. If the cases were connected, taking down one would lead to the next and the next, making it easier for law enforcement to “connect-the-dots.” This is not the case. In each case law enforcement was lucky enough to stumble upon the primary individual(s) and insert themselves into their decision-making process or to obtain enough surveillance information (i.e. photos, wiretaps, informants, etc) to take them down.
But what about the next guy or group of guys? The old axiom, “three people can keep a secret if two are dead,” rings especially true. When a number of inexperienced, undisciplined people are involved in a plot sooner or later someone is going to give something up, allowing law enforcement the opportunity to infiltrate the group and put an end to their plans. However, the fewer the people, and especially the fewer the connections to other radicals, particularly those overseas that may be under electronic monitoring, the less chance we will have to stop them. Similarly, homegrown extremists have the luxury of already operating inside of our overseas and border security layers and being familiar with our culture, thus reducing the planning timeframe and the likelihood they will be caught before executing an attack. Eventually, one of them will get lucky.
So, what do all these cases mean for our national security? Well, for one, it means that al-Qa`ida the group is no longer our only terrorist threat. It proves Osama bin Laden does not need to dispatch a group of violent extremists to the United States to carry out an attack; the ideology is enough to motivate lone-wolves or groups of like-minded radicals to attempt to plan and execute an attack on their own. With the threat emanating from overseas our intelligence community is in a position to intercept phone calls or emails related to planning or a future attack, thus providing critical details on those involved. On the other hand, threats emanating from within our borders are much more difficult to track or interdict due to stringent domestic intelligence laws such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The bad guys are not ignorant of this.
Continuing the mission in Afghanistan, while critical to keeping al-Qa`ida’s core leadership off-balance, does not diminish the threat we face from radical Islamists in the Homeland. While we have no legitimate or factual numbers that we can point to, and therefore cannot correlate our presence in Afghanistan or Iraq with the increase in homegrown threats, on the surface it looks as if the two probably are related. We must face the fact that the threat in Homeland from radical Islamists, both with and without overseas training or connections that could potentially tip-off law enforcement or intelligence officials, is increasing.
As the threat from within increases, the belief by the American people that the Homeland is at risk of a terrorist attack is at its lowest level since before 9/11. According to a Rasmussen poll, 49% of Americans believe a terrorist attack is somewhat likely, down 18% from last year and 21% from two years ago. It can be argued that, just as former-President Bush failed to pursue al-Qa`ida by diverting attention and resources to Iraq, so President Obama and his administration are diverting critical attention and resources to the liberal domestic agenda (i.e. healthcare reform, wealth re-distribution, etc). This creates an apathetic, or at least an improperly informed, environment in which these radicals can operate.
The luck our law enforcement has had recently should be a wake-up call for the Obama administration and the American people. If we are lucky, we get a few warnings before something big happens. We have received more than enough warnings, as evident by the list above; we need to address the problem of homegrown radicals now before one of them succeeds in carrying out a terrorist attack in the Homeland.
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